A study of the operations and performance of selected credit cooperatives in the Philippines by Relampagos, Julius P. et al.
A STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED 
CREDIT COOPERATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Julius P. Relampagos, Mario B. Lamberte 
and Douglas H. Graham 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 90-23 
November 1990 
)ine Institute for Development Studies 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
We wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by the World Council of Credit 
Unions (WOCCU) and the Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. (PFCCI). In 
particular, Mr. Al Harding (WOCCU) and Fr. Benedicto Jayoma (PFCCI) have been instrumental 
in making this study possible. We also acknowledge the invaluable assistance extended to us by 
Ms. Lucy Furo , Ms. Helen Abril and the rest of the PFCCI staff. 
This study would not have been completed without the Cooperation of the managers, officers, 
and members of the twelve (12) credit cooperatives included in the study. It has benefited from the 
assistance extended by the PFCCI regional officers and coordinators, who administered the member-
ship questionnaires, and from the PIDS technical support provided by Mervin Samadan.RowenaRoxas, 
Cris Jovellanos, Glenn Sipin, Nitz Tolentino, and Merle Galvan. 
The Authors 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction 1 
A.The Credit Cooperative Movement in the Philippines 1 
B. Objectives and Scope of the Study 3 
C. Data Collection 4 
II. Background of the Twelve Credit Cooperatives 6 
A.Characteristic s ® 
B.Operation s 8 
C.Share Capital Subscription 8 
D.Savings Mobilization 10 
E.Lending Policies and Practices 12 
F. Loan Renewals/Refinancing and Delinquency Issues 18 
Giiquidity Management Issues 20 
HJnterlending Scheme 22 
I. Relationship with Banks.... 22 
J. Relationship with a Federation and Other Institutions 23 
III. Financial Status of the 12 Credit Cooperatives 25 
A.Growth Performance 25 
B.Operations and Problems 44 
C.Summar y •••• 48 
IV. Socioeconomic Profile of Sample Respondents 50 
A.General Information 50 
B.Occupation and Income 55 
C.Household Status 55 
D.Respondents'Profile Upon Joining the Credit Cooperative 61 
E. Profile of Respondents Engaged in Fanning 67 
F.Summar y 67 
V. Borrowing and Saving Patterns 70 
A.Saving in the Credit Cooperative 70 
B.Borrowing from the Credit Cooperative 75 
C.Membership in the Paluwagan 82 
D.Saving and Borrowing from the Bank 86 
EJnformal Credit 90 
F.Lending Activities 102 
G Summary 102 
VI. Demand for Fixed Deposit and other Issues 103 
A.Demand for Share Capital 103 
B.Deposit Instruments Offered 113 
C.Interlending Scheme 113 
VII. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 114 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. List of Credit Cooperatives, By type 5 
2. Sample Credit Cooperative Members 7 
3. Minimum and Maximum Share Capital Subscription 9 
4. Minimum Paid-Up Share Capital 11 
5. Interest Rate on Savings Deposit, Credit Cooperative vs. Bank 1988 
(Percent per Annum) 11 
6. Single Borrower's Limit 13 
7. Loan Multiples 13 
8. Loan Ceilings and Maturity.... 1*5 
9t Basic Lending Rates < 17 
10. Loan Renewals/Refinancing 19 
11. Policy Instruments: Liquidity Shortage 19 
12. Policy Instruments: Liquidity Surplus 21 
13. Credit Cooperative Affiliations (as of 1989) 24 
14. Total Assets, Nominal vs. Real (1972) 26 
15. Ratio to Total Assets of Fixed and Savings Deposit, 1984-1988 28 
16. Loans-to-Deposit Ratios, 1984-1988 29 
17. Loans-to-Total Assets Ratio, 1984-1988 30 
18. Interest on Loans to Gross Income, 1984-1988 ....: 30 
19. Interest on Loans to Total Expenses, 1984-1988 43 
20. Loan Delinquency Ratio, 1984-1988 43 
21. Net Savings Before Provision, 1984-1988 45 
22. Growth Rates of Dividends and Patronage Refunds 47 
23. Return On Share Capital, 1984-1988 49 
24. Return on Total Assets, 1984-1988 49 
25. General Characteristics of Member-Respondents ; 51 
26. Household Composition , 52 
27. Characteristics of Residential Units .-. 53 
28. Appliances/Other Items Owned 56 
29. Occupation of Respondents 57 
30. Nature of Business 58 
31. Household Members Working 60 
32. Financial Assistance 62 
33. Annual Total Household Income (P) 63 
34. Average Annual Expenditures By Item 63 
36. Respondent Status Upon Joining the Credit Cooperative 65 
37. Farm Size and Value of Production 68 
38. Animals/Poultry Owned 68 
39. Farm Inputs and Equipments 69 
40. Cultivated Land Arrangement 69 
41. Other Sources of Income of Farmer-Respondents 69 
42. Reasons for Joining the Credit Cooperative 71 
43. Initial Fixed Deposit (P) 71 
44. Outstanding Fixed Deposit (P) 72 
45. Savings Deposit in the Credit Cooperative, Past 12 Months 73 
46. Time and Cost in Depositing in the Credit Cooperative 76 
47. Last Loan from the Credit Cooperative 78 
48. Number of Days of Processing Loans 80 
49. Personal Visits in Following Up Loan Application 81 
50. Purpose of Last Loan 83 
51. Other Credit Cooperative Members Within the Family 84 
52. Membership in the Paluwagan 85 
53. Savings Deposits in Banks 87 
54. Time and Cost in Depositing in the Bank 89 
55. Last Loan From Friends/Relatives 91 
56 Amount of Cash Paid Back to Friends/Relatives (Principal and Interest, in P) 92 
57. Purpose of the Loan Obtained From Friends/Relatives 92 
58. Loans Obtained From Moneylenders 93 
59. Amount of Cash Paid Back to Moneylender (Principal and Interest, in P) 95 
60 Purpose of the Loan Obtained From Moneylenders 95 
61. Time and Cost Spent in Obtaining Loans from Moneylenders 96 
62. Number of Days of Processing Loans from Moneylenders 97 
63. Last Loan From Traders 98 
64. Amount of Cash Paid Back to Traders (Principal and Interest, In P) 99 
65. Purpose of the Loan Obtained From Traders 99 
67. Number of Days of Processing Loans from Traders 100 
68. Total Amount of Loans/Assistance Extended by Credit Cooperative Members ... 101 
69. List of Variables 104 
70. Parameter Estimates (Linear), Demand for Share Capital 106 
71. Parameter Estimates (Logarithm), Demand for Share Capital 107 
72. Parameter Estimates (Linear), Demand for Share Capital 108 
73. Parameter Estimates (Logarithm), Demand for Share Capital 109 
74. Parameter Estimates (Linear), Demand for Share Capital 110 
75. Parameter Estimates (Logarithm), Demand for Share Capital I l l 
LIST OF CHARTS 
Selected Balance Sheet Accounts 
(In Nominal Terms), 1984-1988 
Bacolod City Teachers' Credit Coop. 
Notre Dame of Bongao Credit Coop. 
First Community Credit Coop., Inc. 
Filipino Merchants' Credit Coop., Inc. 
Gen. Mariano Alvarez Credit Coop. 
St. Isidore's Credit Cooperative, Inc. 
MSU-IIT Employees Coop., Inc. 
Our Lady of Grace Coop., Inc. 
Paco Credit Cooperative, Inc. 
SMC-Mandaue Credit Union, Inc. 
St. Martin of Tours Credit Coop., Inc. 
Tabuk Credit Cooperative, Inc 
Selected Income Statement Accounts 
(In Nominal Terms), 1984-1988 
Bacolod City Teachers' Credit Coop. 
Notre Dame of Bongao Credit Coop. 
First Community Credit Coop., Inc. 
Filipino Merchants' Credit Coop., Inc. 
Gen. Mariano Alvarez Credit Coop. 
St. Isidore's Credit Cooperative, Inc. 
MSU-IIT Employees Coop., Inc. 
Our Lady of Grace Coop., Inc. 
Paco Credit Cooperative, Inc. 
SMC-Mandaue Credit Union, Inc. 
St. Martin of Tours Credit Coop., Inc. 
Tabuk Credit Cooperative, Inc 
A STUDY OF THE OPERATION S AND PERFORMANCE 
OF SELECTED CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Julius P. Relampagos, Mario B. Lamberte 
and Douglas H. Graham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Credit Cooperative Movement in the Philippines 
Past monetary and credit policies have been biased against informal lenders and informal lending 
practices. Despite this, a segment within the informal credit market (ICM) continued to show dynamism 
in mobilizing resources from savers and in channeling credit to small borrowers in the rural and urban 
areas. Even during the economic crisis of 1983-'84, this segment of the ICM displayed remarkable 
resilience by recovering faster amidst the failures of other financial institutions. This segment is the 
network of credit cooperatives, a sub-system within the cooperative movement. 
Credit cooperatives are generally believed to be the most successful financial institutions 
operating outside Central Bank control. They perform financial intermediation function just like the 
banking institutions, but since they are not covered by Central Bank regulations, they have greater 
flexibility in carrying out savings mobilization and lending functions, hence the term informal financial 
intermediaryHowever, under the cooperative laws enacted recently, the operations of the credit 
cooperatives will be covered by the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and supervised by the 
Cooperative Development Authority.2 This raises aquestion of how the new cooperative code will affect 
the future of credit cooperatives in particular, and the cooperative movement in general. 
The development of credit cooperatives in the country is interesting. Many of them started with 
a handful of members who pooled their meager resources to address their financial problems. Some of 
•Research Associate and Vice-President, respectively, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, and Professor, 
Ohio State University. 
1. See Lamberte and Balbosa (1988) for a more detailed discussion on the criteria for determining which institutions or 
activities belong to the informal financial market. 
2. See Republic Act Numbers 6938 and 6939. 
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them even started as informal associations (i.e., damayan, paluwagan, etc.) with a simple objective of 
collectively looking for means to ease the financial difficulties of individual members.3 But years of 
nurturing collective efforts and of demonstrating capability to serve the common interests of their 
members enabled these credit cooperatives to expand their sphere of influence in communities and 
institutions and, consequently, to inspire membership from different income groups. Not only did they 
expand in terms of membership, physical assets, and capital, some of them have diversified their 
activities (i.e., branched into consumer cooperatives, etc.) to respond to the changing demands of their 
members. Even more interesting is that the creation and growth of the majority of these credit 
cooperatives have not been fueled by the infusion of external funds. They depended solely on internally 
generated capital to sustain operations and enhance their viability as financial intermediaries. In sharp 
contrast, many rural banks, despite heavy subsidy, collapsed and had to be rehabilitated by the 
government. 
All these have given credit cooperatives a new image as an important economic entity in the 
community. The success of many credit cooperatives is now beginning to challenge the old impression 
about the cooperative movement which, in the 1970s, suffered initial organizational errors, resulting in 
the failures of several government-initiated cooperatives. The errors were partly due to lack of 
coordination among primary cooperatives. To avoid past mistakes, some credit cooperatives have 
sought to strengthen inter-cooperative linkages to promote the sharing of technical expertise and even 
suiplus financial resources among themselves. Thus, there now exists a number of secondary 
(provincial) and tertiary (regional) associations/federations of credit cooperatives which oversee wider 
coordination among primary cooperatives. 
With its viability to supply the much-needed credit in the countryside, the credit cooperative sub-
System has inevitably gained the status of an economic force capable of stimulating progress. In fact, 
some small enterprises which encountered difficulty in obtaining credit from formal financial institu-
tions have turned to credit cooperatives for their financial needs. A number of credit cooperatives have 
also began to be tapped as conduits for loans to specific borrowers, in line with the previous policy of 
countryside development through infusion of external funds, including funds from non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and government agencies. Among the familiar sources of external funds for 
credit cooperatives are the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), Department of Trade and 
Industry, Department of Agriculture, Land Bank of the Philippines, and other national and local 
organizations. However, credit cooperatives do not direct their loanable funds to specific sectors of the 
economy. Their loan portfolio can be as diverse as the economic activities of their members. 
Credit cooperatives have also been successful in mobilizing deposits, especially among low-
income individuals who are generally discouraged from saving in banks by the minimum amount of 
3. A damayan is a mutual self-help group in which members turn in equal amounts of money to create a common fund 
known as the Damayan Trust Fund. It extends medical and funeral assistance among its members through contributions from the 
said fund. A Damayan Trust Fund exists in some credit cooperatives where all of the damayan members are also cooperative 
members. However, not all credit cooperative members may be members of the Damayan Trust Fund. A paluwagan is the 
Philippine version of a ROSCA (Lamberte and Bunda 1988). # 
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deposits required and by the relatively high transaction costs associated with smaller deposits. They 
have effectively provided low-cost alternative saving instruments for low-income depositors. However, 
their deposit-taking function has limitations. For one, some of them do not yet offer savings and time 
deposit instruments, which limits a member's investment choices. This limitation could pose a 
constraint for the future growth of credit cooperatives into bigger financial institutions. But on the 
whole, their success in mobilizing deposits has, over the years, basically sustained their growth in terms 
of membership and physical assets. 
One of the concerns of the present development strategy of the government is to mobilize the 
NGOs, cooperatives, and other self-help groups to promote livelihood and employment projects 
especially in indigenous areas. Specifically, the government, through its special credit programs has 
already started lending to target sectors, with NGOs and cooperatives as conduits.4 Within the 
cooperative movement, the credit cooperatives have been eyed as effective conduits of external funds 
since they possess some general features of a banking institution. Thus, to determine whether or not they 
can be mobilized effectively as credit conduits, an in-depth understanding of credit cooperative behavior 
and performance is necessary. 
B. Objectives and Scope of the Study 
This study attempts to provide an adequate understanding of what a credit cooperative is, in terms 
of operations and policies, financial performance, and membership. Specifically, the major objectives 
of the study are: 
a. to determine the effectiveness of credit cooperatives in meeting the needs of their members 
and, where applicable, to suggest ways and means to improve services; and 
b. to identify possible management financial weaknesses in their operations. 
Thus, the analysis is divided into three major groupings: 
1. Operations and Policies 
a. the policies and practices associated with the savings and lending activities of credit 
cooperatives; 
b. the degree of flexibility they adopt in implementing credit cooperative rules and regulations; 
c. the issues and problems encountered in their regular operations, and the way to handle them; 
d. their relationship with other savings and credit institutions, both formal and informal, and 
the extent of competition among themselves and with other institutions of similar 
functions; and 
e. the relationship and/or affiliations of primary credit cooperatives with associations or 
federations. 
4. See Lamberte (1990). 
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2. Financial Performance 
a. the growth performance and patterns of credit cooperatives; and 
b. the problems and constraints in their growth process. 
3. Membership 
a. the overall profile and characteristics of credit cooperative members; 
b. the saving and borrowing behavior of members; 
c. the extent of membership participation in cooperative activities; 
d. the lending behavior of members; and 
e. the members' level of awareness about cooperative issues and related matters. 
Included in the third major grouping is an estimation of the demand for credit cooperative fixed 
deposits that helps explain the saving behavior of members. 
Earlier studies on credit cooperatives were conducted by Lamberte and Balbosa (1988), 
Lamberte (1988), and Lamberte, Relampagos, and Graham (1990). The most recent study focused on 
the financial performance and membership aspects of the eight credit cooperatives in the context of the 
rural sector, particularly in Luzon area. 
In this current study, 12 credit cooperatives with diverse characteristics were included in the 
survey. They were chosen based on broad regional groupings. Five of them were from Luzon (with two 
operating in Metro Manila), three from the Visayas, and four from Mindanao. According to types of 
operation, eight of them were community-based (with seven non-sectarian and one parish-based), three 
were institution-based, and one was market vendor-based. Table 1 shows the listing of the 12 
cooperatives by type and their location. Most of them operate in the leading urban centers of the country. 
The survey is composed of three parts. The first is the manager/officer portion which explores 
the management aspect of credit cooperative operations. The second deals with the financial statements 
and other quantitative indicators culled from the records of these cooperatives. The third deals with the 
membership aspect of the survey. 
C. Data Collection 
1. Manager/Officer Portion 
An interview schedule was administered to the managers/ officers of the 12 credit cooperatives, 
though additional information were obtained from the Board of Directors. This part explored the 
management aspect, including1 the policies and practices of these cooperatives. The managers/officers 
were visited during the period from November 1989 to February 1990. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
LIST OF CREDIT COOPERATIVES, BY TYPE 
Type/Name Location 
A. Non-Sectarian Community Based 
1. Tabuk Credit Cooperative, Inc. Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao 
2. St. Martin of Tours Kilusang 
Bayan sa Pagpapautang, Inc. Bocaue, Bulacan 
3. Our Lady of Grace HNS Credit 
Cooperative, Inc. Caloocan City, Metro Manila 
4. Gen. Mariano Alvarez Credit 
Cooperative, Inc. GMA, Cavite 
5. St. Isidore's Credit 
Cooperative, Inc. Mc Arthur, Leyte 
6. First Community Credit 
Cooperative, Inc. Cagayan de Oro City, Mis. Or. 
7. Notre Dame of Bongao Integrated 
Cooperative, Inc. Bongao, Tawi-Tawi 
B. Parish Community Based 
8. Paco Credit Cooperative, Inc. 
C. Institution Based 
9. Bacolod City Public School 
Teachers'Credit Coop., Inc. 
10. San Miguel Corp. Mandaue 
Brewery Employees Cooperative 
Credit Union, Inc. 
11. Mindanao State University-
Iligan Institute of Technology 
Employees Cooperative, Inc. 
Paco, Manila 
Bacolod City, Negros Occ. 
Mandaue City, Cebu 
Iligan City, Lanao del Norte 
D. Market Vendor Based 
12. Filipino Merchants' Credit 
Cooperative, Inc. Davao City, Davao del Sur 
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2. Financial Statements and Other Quantitative Indicators 
The balance sheets and income statements from 1984 to 1988 were obtained during visits to each 
cooperative. The allocation of net income or net savings was also obtained during interviews with 
managers. Some of the forms containing quantitative information were sent after the interviews. 
3. Membership Portion 
A separate survey questionnaire was administered by the field interviewers to sample member-
respondents. There were originally 300 member-respondents chosen out of some 30,331 active and 
inactive credit cooperative members. They were allocated proportionately to the size of each credit 
cooperative and were selected using simple random sampling technique. However, only 227 of the 
respondents completed the survey instrument. The survey questionnaires were personally administered 
by the field officers of the Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. (PFCCI) from November 
1989 to May 1990. Table 2 shows the sample respondents per credit cooperative. 
This paper is divided into seven chapters. The next chapter describes the characteristics, policies, 
and practices—as obtained from the manager questionnaires—of the 12 credit cooperatives. Chapter 
III analyzes their financial status, including their growth performance and patterns. Chapter IV presents 
the socioeconomic profile of credit cooperative members, followed by a discussion of their saving and 
borrowing behavior in Chapter V. Chapter VI discusses the empirical results of the analysis of the 
demand for fixed deposits and some issues pertaining to the level of awareness of credit cooperative 
members. The last chapter presents the summary, conclusion, and policy recommendations of the study. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TWELVE CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
A. Characteristics 
Most of the credit cooperatives in this study were created through the initiatives of civic-minded 
individuals in the local community, typically through joint efforts by parish priests and local leaders 
seeking to organize a cooperative that would address the livelihood, financial, and other problems of the 
community. Only one credit cooperative started as an informal association known as "Damayan." The 
rest operated as credit cooperatives from the beginning of their establishment. Three of them were 
established before 1970, while the majority between 1970-1985. All but one are registered with the 
Bureau of Cooperative Development (BCOD), now the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). 
The credit cooperatives operate in their respective locality with an average number of 65,273 
voters.5 
5. Minimum age of qualified voters is 18 years old. 
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Table 22 
SAMPLE CREDIT COOPERATIVE MEMBERS 
Credit 
Cooperative 
Total Number 
of Membersjy 
Targeted 
Sample Size 
Actual (Completed) 
Sample Size 
TABUK 
SMT 
GMA 
OUR LADY 
PACO 
BCPST 
SMC-MAND 
ISIDORE 
FICCO 
MSU-ET 
FIL-MER 
BONGAO 
2570 
(9.0) 
5153 
(17.0) 
674 
(2.0) 
4610 
(15.0) 
404 
(1.0) 
2011 
(7.0) 
1281 
(4.0) 
907 
(3.0) 
8168 
(27.0) 
1210 
(4.0) 
2474 
(8.0) 
869 
(3.0) 
25 
(9.0) 
51 
(17.0) 
7 
(2.0) 
45 
(15.0) 
4 
(1.0) 
20 
(7.0) 
13 
(4.0) 
10 
(3.0) 
80 
(27.0) 
12 
(4.0) 
24 
(8.0) 
9 
(3.0) 
25 
51 
10 
0 
0 
20 
1 
8 
68 
12 
24 
8 
Total 30331 300 227 
1/ As provided by the field officers of PFCCI. 
Figures in parentheses are percent to total. 
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B. Operations 
Of the 12 credit cooperatives, seven do not own the building where they hold office. However, 
only four of them are paying rent; the rest are occupying the building free of charge since their operations 
and services are directly linked to other institutions like schools, parishes, and offices. On the other hand, 
the credit cooperatives which own their office buildings are non-sectarian community-based, maintain-
ing independent operations. 
Like any other office or business entity, these credit cooperatives have fixed office hours, in most 
cases from 8 to 5 or 9 to 6, with the usual noon breaks on weekdays, and morning sessions on Saturdays.6 
Four of the cooperatives, however, extend their official time up to Saturday afternoon. Only one does 
not observe a regular shift as its office hours are adjusted based on the availability of the cooperative staff 
who work on a part-time basis. 
Several of the credit cooperatives are flexible in observing officer hours. They try to 
accommodate special cases, such as 1) depositors from distant places who try to beat the closing time 
for transactions; 2) borrowers whose loans have to be processed a few hours before closing time because 
of emergency reasons (i.e., accidents, hospitalization, etc.); and 3) members who have to transact 
business during noon breaks or a few minutes after closing time because they could not leave their work 
(e.g., market vendors who could not leave their stalls, office workers who could not absent from work, 
etc.). However, this flexibility had to be exercised discretely to prevent abuse by the general 
membership. Normally, the credit cooperatives do not impose additional charges for transactions 
outside the official time, which emphasizes their service-oriented philosophy. 
Some of the credit cooperatives conduct official transactions outside their office premises. This 
is especially true among those whose significant proportion of general membership consists of market 
vendors. Market vendor-based credit cooperatives assign a collector in the marketplace where he/she 
accepts the individual deposits and loan payments of vendor-members. 
C. Share Capital Subscription 
All the 12 credit cooperatives require their members to subscribe minimum fixed shares, or their 
equivalent in peso fixed deposits. The peso value of share capital varies among the cooperatives, from 
P10 to P100 per share. It appears that open-type credit cooperatives (i.e., community- and market-
based) have higher values per share than the closed-typC ones (i.e., institution- or employee-based). 
Three credit cooperatives do not translate the value of fixed deposits in terms of number of shares 
subscribed. 
Six credit cooperatives require their members to subscribe to a minimum of five shares. Only 
one requires a minimum capital subscription of 50 shares. The par value of one share of stock is P100 
in the case of the six credit cooperatives, while the rest charge lower than P100 per share (Table 3). Most 
of them do not impose a ceiling or maximum number of shares per member. The bigger the amount of 
6. This type of office schedule is prevalent among private offices. 
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Table 22 
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SHARE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION 
Minimum Maximum 
Credit 
Cooperative No. of Shares 
Total 
Value (P) No. of Shares 
Total 
Value (P) 
TABUK n.a. 500 n.a. n.a. 
FIL-MER 5 500 200 20,000 
SMT 5 250 n.a. n.a. 
BCPST n.a. 500 
i j 
n.a. n.a. 
PACO 50 i ,oor n.a. n.a. 
GMA 5 500 150 15,000 
OUR LADY 5 500 n.a. n.a. 
SMC-MAND n.a. 25 n.a. n.a. 
ISIDORE 5 500 n.a. n.a. 
FICCO 10 1,000 n.a. 2/ 
MSU-DT 6 120 n.a. n.a. 
BONGAO 5 200 50 2,000 
n.a. = not applicable 
_1/ For new members, P500.00 for old members 
2J Not more than 20 percent of total assets of the cooperative 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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fixed deposit of a member, the bigger the amount of money he/she can borrow, and he/she receives more 
dividends at the end of the year. Unlike the stockholders of typical corporations, the voting power of 
a credit cooperative members is independent of their share capital subscription. 
As stated in the by-laws of these credit cooperatives, a member is required to put up an equity 
in the form of fixed deposits before he/she can avail of the cooperative borrowing privileges. Not all 
of them, however, require their members to put up the entire minimum fixed deposits. Five credit 
cooperatives allow their members to borrow even if the latter have paid less than the minimum share 
capital required (Table 4). The members, of course, have to satisfy other requirements, such as attending 
a membership training seminar, payment of registration fees, etc. Further, in some credit cooperatives, 
members have to wait for a certain time period after paying their minimum paid-up share or fixed deposit 
before their loan application is entertained. In one credit cooperative, the waiting time takes three 
months. 
The credit cooperatives made use mainly of the loan retention policy and promotional 
campaigns, such as raffles, to encourage members to increase their paid-up share capital. Other 
initiatives taken to increase the members' fixed deposits include retention of a certain portion of 
dividends and patronage refunds, and some kind of forced saving plan. 
D. Savings Mobilization 
Eleven creditcooperatives accept savings deposits from members. It appears, however, that only 
three of them actively mobilize savings deposits. Interest rates paid on savings deposits vary from four 
to nine percent per annum (Table 5), which are generally higher than the prevailing bank rates. This is 
not surprising because most of the credit cooperatives use the interest rate on savings deposit of nearby 
banks as their reference rate and add a premium to it to attract deposits. In fact, seven of them are closely 
monitoring the bank interest rate, and either adopt it or offer a rate that is higher by 0.5 to 2.5 percentage 
points. Others base their interest rates on the income performance of the cooperative. 
In most cases, those directly involved in determining the interest rate on savings deposit are the 
cashier/treasurer and the board of directors of the credit cooperative. The cashier/ treasurer monitors the 
bank interest rate and disseminates the information to the board members for discussion. The decision 
is announced to the general membership through board resolution. 
Most credit cooperatives review regularly their interest rates on savings deposit. The frequency 
of review varies between cooperatives—monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, or once every two 
years. Other credit cooperatives review their interest rates only when declared by the authorities 
concerned, or when there is a demand from members. All these suggest that credit cooperatives follow 
a flexible interest rate policy. 
The credit cooperatives admit, that among the factors that motivate members to open savings 
deposit account in the cooperative, the interest rate is second only in importance to the accessibility of 
the cooperative office and to enhance access to borrowing services. Other important factors include 
safety of deposits and the low cost in making a deposit, which rank third and fourth, respectively. 
Table 4 
MINIMUM PAID-UP SHARE CAPITAL 
Credit Cooperative % 
TABUK 100 
F1L-MER 25 
SMT 100 
BCPST 50 
PACO 100 
GMA 100 
OURLADY 25 
SMC-MAND n.d. 
ISIDORE 25 
FICCO 10 
MSU-nT 100 
BONGAO 100 
Average 67 
Standard Deviation 39 
n .d. = 110 dat* available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Manager's Survey, 1989. 
Table 5 
INTEREST RATE ON SAVINGS DEPOSIT 
Credit Cooperative vs. Bank Rate, 1988 
(Percent Per Annum) 
Credit Credit Cooperative Observed 
Cooperative Rate Bank Rate 
TABUK 7.5 6.5 
FIL-MER 6.0 5.0 
SMT 8.5 6.0 
BCPST 5.0 5.0 
PACO 5.0 4.0 
GMA 9.0 8.5 
OURLADY 4.0 4.5 
SMC-MAND n.a. n.a. 
ISIDORE 4.0 n.a. 
FICCO 6.0 4.5 
MSU-IIT 6.0 5.0 
BONGAO 5.0 5.0 
Average 6.0 5.4 
Standard Deviation 1.69 1.31 
n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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Six of the credit cooperatives do not resort to any promotional programs, gimmicks, or incentives 
to encourage members to increase their savings and fixed deposits. Those who do have launched raffle 
draws and a beauty contest. Others have implemented savings programs, such as the "Tipid Movement" 
and the "Forced Saving Plan." Nonetheless, the twelve cooperatives continue to educate their members 
on the advantages of saving in the cooperative, such as the more attractive interest earnings due to the 
absence of withholding tax on interest income, increase of borrowing privileges through bigger loan 
amount, and others. Another important advantage is that the credit cooperatives allow the members to 
withdraw their savings deposits anytime they want. This policy is adopted by ten of the credit 
cooperatives. 
Six credit cooperatives offer time deposits. However, the volume of time deposits mobilized 
from members appears very minimal, and practically nil in some of them. The interest rates vary from 
8 to 12 percentper annum, depending on the maturity. The procedure adopted in determining the interest 
rate on time deposit is similar to that of the interest rate on savings deposit. The interest rates are 
reviewed regularly. Some of these credit cooperatives consider their interest rates on time deposits 
competitive with bank rates. 
E. Lending Policies and Practices 
Lending procedures and policies are one of the important matters discussed during membership 
training seminars . Members have to understand and accept the lending policies and practices before they 
join the cooperative. The credit cooperatives normally put into writing the rules and guidelines on 
borrowing in order to minimize, if not eliminate, conflicts and misinterpretations of policies arising from 
lending transactions. Only one of the 12 sample cooperatives does not have a written lending policy. 
One important policy pertains to the loan multiple or the borrowing capacity of members. Table 
6 shows the absolute maximum limit per single borrower of the 12 cooperatives. It can be observed that 
open-type credit cooperatives tend to have higher absolute limit than closed-type ones.7 
The determination of the maximum loanable amount varies across the credit cooperatives. 
Seven of them adopt a single loan multiple while the rest have several loan multiples according to certain 
loan factors. Among the latter, some base the multiple on loan types (i.e., providential and productive), 
characteristics of borrower (i.e., first time, delinquent, non-delinquent, etc.), mode of payment (i.e., 
daily, weekly, bi-monthly, etc.), loan maturity (i.e., short-term, medium-term, and long-term), and the 
amount of fixed deposit. Table 7 distinguishes credit cooperatives according to their loan multiples. The 
majority of those following a single loan multiple maintain a 2:1 ratio. This means that the maximum 
amount of loan a member can borrow is twice the value of his share capital. One credit cooperative 
adopts a 3:1 ratio. 
On the other hand, two of the credit cooperatives using several loan multiples emphasize the 
characteristics of borrower in determining the loan multiple. In fact, one came up with a detailed 
classification of members, i.e., class A, class B, class C, and delinquent. In this cooperative, a class A 
7. Closed-type credit cooperatives are the institution-based or employee-based ones. 
Table 6 
SINGLE BORROWER'S LIMIT 
Credit Cooperative Amount (P) 
TAB UK 1/ 
FIL-MER 40,000 
SMT 100,000 
BCPST 6,000 
PACO 2J 
GMA 30,000 
OURLADY 50,000 
SMC-MAND 2 1 
ISIDORE 4,000 
FICCO 80,000 
MSU-nT 15,000 
BONGAO 20,000 
JJ Not more than 10 percent of the share deposits of 
the cooperative. 
.2/. Not more than 10 percent of members' equity of the 
cooperative for businessmen and professionals; 
P10,000 for vendors. 
2 1 Depending on the 50 percent take home pay of a member 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
Table 7 
LOAN MULTIPLES 
Credit Cooperative Type 
TABUK Single 
FIL-MER Several 
SMT Single 
BCPST Single 
PACO Several 
GMA Single 
OURLADY Several 
SMC-MAND Single 
ISIDORE Single 
FICCO Several 
MSU-HT Several 
BONGAO Single 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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member may borrow up to 300 percent of his/her fixed deposit, 200 percent for class B, 150 percent for 
class C, and 100 percent for a delinquent member. Another credit cooperative classifies borrowers into 
delinquent and non-delinquent payors. Two credit cooperatives offer a loan multiple of three to 
borrowers who pay the loan more frequently (i.e., daily basis) and to those who apply for productive 
loans. None of the credit cooperatives changed their loan multiples very recently. 
A borrower is usually required to have a co-maker instead of a collateral. In most cases, each 
member is required to have a co-maker who can guarantee the loan in the event of failure of the borrower 
to pay. Per policy of six credit cooperatives, a co-maker can only guarantee up to 50 percent of the total 
loan value of the borrower. Since the loan value vis-a-vis a member's fixed deposit typically has a 2:1 
ratio, the credit cooperatives require that a co-maker guarantees the other half of the loan value not 
covered by the borrower's fixed deposit. The majority of the credit cooperatives are flexible enough to 
allow the co-maker to use his/her deposit, including the obligated portion, for guaranteeing a loan. Only 
four credit cooperatives require their co-makers to use only the unobligated portion of their deposits for 
loan guarantee purposes. A few credit cooperatives may require collateral only in exceptional cases, 
such as: 1) the loan applied for exceeds a certain limit, usually the absolute maximum limit per single 
borrower; 2) a member does not have a co-maker; and 3) the loan is exorbitantly high (i.e., house 
financing, livelihood projects, etc.). 
Most credit cooperatives impose a uniform ceiling on the amount of emergency loans and regular 
loans. The ceiling for emergency loans varies across credit cooperatives from P500 to PI 0,000 per single 
borrower, while the maximum absolute limit per single borrower is adopted for regular loans. Table 8 
shows the current ceiling per loan type and the longest maturity period. 
Three credit cooperatives avail of a special credit program of the Department of Trade and,. 
Industry-Tulong sa Tao Program (DTI-TST). The loan package, intended to finance livelihood projects 
of cooperative members, consists of relending schemes for individuals and groups. The loan ceiling for 
individual relending scheme ranges from P20,000 to P25.000 with maturities of from one to three years, 
while the ceiling for group relending scheme can be as much as P200,000 with a maturity of five years. 
Another special credit program is the Rural Agricultural Credit Financing Loan being extended by the 
Philippine Business for Social Progress to finance livelihood projects. 
Loan interest rates charged by the cooperatives are set by the board of directors and approved 
by the general assembly. Some credit cooperatives align their interest rates to the prevailing lending 
rates of other institutions, while others offer rates lower, than those offered by banks. Six credit 
cooperatives review their loan interest rates regularly and make adjustments when necessary. The others 
review their rates whenever needed. Nine credit cooperatives made upward adjustments in their interest 
rates after the 1983-84 economic crisis, while five adjusted during the 1988-89 period. Among the 
reasons mentioned for making those adjustments are: 1) cooperative lending rate is too low relative to 
the prevailing lending rate in the area of operation, 2) simplification of interest rate according tp the 
mode of payment, 3) compensating for losses due to loan delinquency, 4) coping with inflation and the 
rising operational costs, and 5) increasing the take home loans of members. 
None of the 12 credit cooperatives charge different interest rates on loans according to sizes and 
maturities, which is the usual practice among banks. Eight credit cooperatives use a single interest rate 
Table 27 (continuation) 
LOAN CEILINGS AND MATURITY 
Credit 
Cooperative 
Regular Loans Emergency Loans 
Current 
Ceiling 
(P) 
Maturity 
Period 
(days) 
Current 
Ceiling 
(P) 
Maturity 
Period 
(days) 
TABUK V 365 500 365 
FIL-MER 40,000 365 n.a. n.a. 
SMT 100,000 1,095 5,000 150 
BCPST 6,000 450 500 30 
PACO 21 270 2,000 60 
GMA 30,000 450 10,000 180 
OURLADY 50,000 360 n.a. n.a. 
SMC-MAND 3/ 1,095 500 365 
ISIDORE n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
FICCO 80,000 1,095 AJ 365 
MSU-DT 15,000 365 300 90 
BONGAO 20,000 1,277 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. = not applicable (no emergency loans) 
n.d. = no data available 
I /Not more than 10 percent of fixed deposit of cooperative 
2/ Not more than 10 percent of fixed deposit of 
cooperative for businessmen and professionals; P10.000 
for vendors 
3/ Based on the 50 percent take home pay of the borrowers 
4/ Based on 100 percent fixed deposit of borrowers 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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for all types of loans, while the others charge differentiated interest rates either according to loan types 
or to mode of payment. Those which follow the latter appear to charge lower interest rates on loans that 
are amortized more frequently (i.e., daily and weekly). This strategy is aimed at achieving high turn-
over rate for their loanable funds. It also helps maintain the liquidity of the cooperative to accommodate 
more borrowers. Six credit cooperatives discount interest payments in advance, while the others charge 
interest payments on the remaining balance. Table 9 shows the basic lending rates charged by the 12 
credit cooperatives. 
Ten credit cooperatives consider their interest rates on loans competitive with bank rates. In fact, 
the majority of them charge interest rates at two to 15 percentage points lower than the prevailing bank 
lending rates in their areas of operation. On the other hand, one credit cooperative does not consider the 
banks as competitors because its clientele is different from that of the banks'. 
Aside from the interest rates charged on loans, borrowers pay additional charges in imposed by 
the cooperative, such as service fees, loan application fees, filing fees, loan protection plan fees for 
insured loans, notarial fees, and others. It should be noted, however, that most credit cooperatives collect 
service fees which already include all other charges. Service fees vary from one to four percent of loan 
value, depending on the maturity period. In a few cases, service fees are expressed as a fixed peso amount 
for every one hundred pesos, or even one thousand pesos, worth of loan. Loans with longer maturities 
are charged higher service fees. These non-interest charges are collected in advance. 
Most of the credit cooperatives are careful in maintaining the balance between the value of loans 
they approve and their available loanable funds. Only three of them experienced frequent shortage of 
loanable funds. Nevertheless, they managed to overcome the problem by: 1) drawing upon the saving* 
deposits they held in banks, 2) preterminating their time deposits placed with banks and other short-term 
investments, 3) making use of the general reserve fund, 4) improving the loan collection system, 5) 
scheduling future loan approvals based on projected cash flow pattern, 6) continuing the membership 
drive, 7) massive re-education of members on loan repayment and related lending policies, and 8) 
securing additional funding from institutions with which the cooperative is affiliated. 
The majority of credit cooperatives are strict when it comes to evaluation of loan applicants. 
Eight credit cooperatives require all loan applicants, including repeat borrowers with good track record, 
to undergo the same process of loan evaluation every time they apply for a loan. This has enabled them 
to closely monitor delinquent and non-delinquent borrowers. On the other hand, those credit 
cooperatives which do not require repeat borrowers with good track record to undergo the same loan 
evaluation process simply waive some of the loan application procedures. For instance, they no longer 
require the borrowers concerned to attend the delinquency control seminar prior to credit committee 
evaluation, or to pass through the credit committee for screening and evaluation of loan application. In 
fact, one credit cooperative waives the requirement on presenting a co-maker for a borrower with 
extremely good membership record. 
Six credit cooperatives claimed to have rejected some loan applications in 1988. The proportion 
of rejected loans to total loan applications, however, was minimal. The highest rejection rate shown by 
one credit cooperative was only two percent. This indicates that outright rejection of a loan application 
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Table 9 
BASIC LENDING RATES 
Credit Cooperative Interest Rate (%) 
TABUK 12.0 p.a. 
FIL-MER 
M y 1.0 /mo. 
Wee^y 1.2/mo. 
Bi-mon'thly 1.5/mo. 
Monthly 1.5/mo. 
S M T 21.0 p.a. 
BCPST 
Regular 12.0 p.a. 
Contingency 2.0/mo. 
PACO 
D a U y 12.0 p.a. 
Weekly 13.0 p.a. 
Bi-monthly 14.0 p.a. 
Monthly 15.0p.a. 
G M A 18.0 p.a. 
OURLADY 12 Op a. 
SMC-MAND 6.25 p.a. 
ISIDORE 24.0 p.a. 
FICCO 
Regular 8.0 p.a. 
Special Credit Program 12.0 p.a. 
Appliance 11.0 p.a. 
Motor Vehicle 12.0 p.a. 
Petty Cash 1.0/mo. 
MSU-IIT i8.o p . a . 
BONGAO 24.0 p.a. 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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is seldom. What usually happens is that credit cooperatives reduce the amount of loans approved or 
granted as penalty to borrowers who do not satisfy all the lending requirements and who are delinquent 
in complying with their obligations. 
Aside from lending and deposit services, some credit cooperatives, through their Damayan Trust 
Fund, have provided members with hospitalization and death benefits. Beneficiaries of the deceased 
Trust Fund member automatically receive cash donations/gifts from the cooperatives as funeral 
assistance. However, not all cooperative members are also Trust Fund members. Nonetheless, when 
an ordinary cooperative members dies, his/her beneficiaries are automatically entitled to a funeral 
assistance through voluntary individual contributions of the general membership. Usually, the 
individual contribution is automatically debited to the deposit accounts of the members. Likewise, some 
credit cooperatives provide subsidies for hospitalization expenses of members. A few credit coopera-
tives offer scholarships for children of members. The scholarships cover college schooling for courses 
specified by the cooperative. 
F. Loan Renewals/Refinancing and Delinquency Issues 
Loan renewals and refinancing are allowed in most of the credit cooperatives. Two of them 
require the borrowers to pay fully their outstanding loans before their new loan applications are 
entertained. The loan repayment rate allowable for renewal/ refinancing varies across credit coopera-
tives from 50 to 80 percent (Table 10). However, these cooperatives include certain conditions in the 
loan renewal policy. For instance, they automatically deduct the remaining balance of the previous loan 
from the new loan. Some credit cooperatives require members to put up a new deposit equity as a 
percentage of new loan. For eight credit cooperatives, the proportion of renewals/refinancing to the total 
loan applications averaged 59 percent in 1988. Three credit cooperatives even had higher ratios of up 
to 100 percent. 
In the case of the eight credit cooperatives,8 eight borrowers who are delinquent in their payments 
are also given the same privilege of loan renewal/refinancing. However, two additional conditions had 
been imposed on delinquent borrowers who seek to renew their loans. One, they are required to attend 
an orientation on delinquency control and prompt payment of loans. Second, they are asked to settle all 
fines and overdue charges associated with loan delinquency. In six credit cooperatives, the proportion 
of total loan renewals with delinquent installmentpayments averaged 24 percent in 1988. Three of them 
had higher ratios of up to 50 percent. Moreover, two credit cooperatives do not allow borrowers who 
continue to be delinquent after the first loan renewal to renew their loans for the second time. One credit 
cooperative allows a delinquent borrower to renew/refinance the loan from two to three times in 
succession. 
The average rate of delinquency considered dangerous by the credit cooperatives is 21 percent 
of the total value of loans outstanding. Credit cooperatives with conservative lending policies do not 
* 
8, These credit cooperatives do not have a common definition of delinquency. However, the majority of them appear to 
consider a loan delinquent whenever the borrower fail to pay partly or in full the loan on the contracted date. Two credit coopera-
tives consider a loan delinquent 30 days after the due date for scheduled amortization, while one credit cooperative classifies a 
loan delinquent one day after its maturity. Another credit cooperative considers a loan delinquent based on the number of months 
it has been in arrears for a given maturity. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
L O A N RENEWALS/REFINANCING 
Credit 
Cooperative 
Loan Repayment 
(%) 
T A B U K 50 
FIL-MER n.a. 
S M T 50 
BCPST 50 
P A C O 75 
G M A 50 
OURLADY 80 
SMC-MAND 75 
ISIDORE n.d. 
FICCO 70 
MSU-IIT 70 
B O N G A O n.a. 
n.d. = no data available 
n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
Table 11 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS: LIQUIDITY SHORTAGE 
Instrument No. of Credit Cooperatives 
1. Raising interest rates on loans 1 
2. Raising service fees on loans 1 
3. Lowering loan multiple 1 
4. Increasing time daly in releasing loan 3 
5. Borrowing from CFF interlending scheme 4 
6. Borrowing from bank or other FIs 2 
7. Promoting new membership 2 
8. Promoting savings and time deposits. 
through higher deposit rates 3 
9. Promote more rigorous loan recovery 5 
10. Introduce more stringent loan 
renewal terms and conditions 4 
11. Reducing patronage refund and increasing 
interest on share capital 2 
12. Increase loan retention limit 2 
13. Updating.of records showing cash 
inflows and outflows 1 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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allow the rate of delinquency to exceed 20 percent. It appears that larger credit cooperatives have lower 
rate of delinquency, which suggests that they are more efficient in managing their loan portfolio. Thus, 
increasing the size of a credit cooperative does not necessarily lead to a loss of control of its operations. 
They only have to have an efficient management team and a well-functioning operational systems. 
Some credit cooperatives have not been documenting the outstanding loans in arrears according 
to the length of time past due. This is true in the case of employee-based credit cooperatives. For them, 
past due loans are very minimal because repayment is done through salary deduction. Another reason 
why aging of loans, considered to be a time-intensive task, may not be done is that the cooperative staff 
might be overloaded with other regular activities (i.e., processing deposit and loan documents, etc.). 
Aging of loans is important in improving the management's control of operations, especially when it 
formulates loan collection program. 
G. Liquidity Management Issues 
Four of the credit cooperatives had experienced a temporary shortage of funds, which was 
mainly attributed to the following: (1) a slow turnover of loanable funds due to delays in loan repayments 
of some members; (2) excess of loan approvals over available funds due to failure of the cooperative to 
update records showing cash inflows and outflows; and (3) delays in the remittance of employee-
members' regular contribution/saving to the cooperative. The third factor, however, was beyond the 
control of the cooperatives. In a particular credit cooperative, the liquidity shortfall was a consequence 
of the problem of the institution to which the cooperative is attached. 
On the other hand, another four credit cooperatives experienced excess liquidity due to a slack 
in demand for loans resulting from a surge in the flow of deposits. The excess liquidity in some credit 
cooperatives was even aggravated by the inflow of funds for relending programs from funding agencies/ 
institutions. The rest of the credit cooperatives experienced both liquidity shortage and surplus for the 
past 12 months due to the same factors. 
Table 11 shows the policy instruments resorted to by the credit cooperatives to adjust to a 
liquidity shortage. It can be observed that a number of them tend to use easy-to-iinplement policy 
instruments without necessarily going through the process of amending the cooperative by-laws or 
written lending policies. Moreover, the use of these policy instruments, such as promotion of more 
vigorous loan recovery, can be decided upon immediately by the manager alone. The two other 
instruments, i.e., borrowing from Central Finance Facility (CFF) and introducing more stringent loan 
renewal terms and conditions, normally require the approval of the Board. 
On the other hand, Table 12 shows the policy instruments typically used by the credit 
cooperatives to solve excess liquidity. Most of them have deposited their excess liquidity in banks 
usually located in the same locality. Other have increased the loan multiple and reduced loan processing 
period to encourage more borrowings. 
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T a b l e 2 2 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS: LIQUIDITY SURPLUS 
Instruments No. of Credit Cooperatives 
1. Lowering interest rates on loans 2 
2. Lowering service fees on loans 2 
3. Raising loan multiple 4 
4. Reducing loan processing/releasing period 4 
5. Relaxing loan renewal terms and conditions 2 
6. Depositing excess in CFF 2 
7. Depositing excess in bank or other FIs 6 
8. Lowering interest on savings and time deposits 2 
9. Increasing patronage refund (and lowering 
dividends on share capital) 3 
10. Reducing effort to recruit new members 0 
11. Reducing loan retention limit 1 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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H. Interlending Scheme 
The interlending scheme can be generated viably among credit cooperatives given the hetero-
geneity in their cash flow patterns. Seven credit cooperatives are currently shareholders in the CFF.9 
Two of them became shareholders only in 1989. As of December 1988, only one credit cooperative 
made a substantial investment of over P200,000 in the CFF; the rest have investments of P5,000 and 
below. Not all credit cooperatives earned dividends on their investments with the CFF in 1988. Some 
of them obtained dividends in 1989. 
Of the seven credit cooperatives, only one availed of the CFF's lending facility. This was the 
same cooperative which had substantial investment in CFF. It borrowed three times, and the amount of 
the most recent loan was almost twice the value of its investment in CFF. The interest was 12 percent 
for one year maturity. 
There are several reasons why credit cooperatives have placed their excess reserves in CFF even 
if some of them have not borrowed from the CFF. Among these are: (1) the credit cooperatives wanted 
to promote the spirit of cooperativism; (2) the CFF is considered stable; (3) investment in CFF is more 
profitable than in banks; and (4) the credit cooperative wanted to strengthen their relationship with the 
PFCCI. 
On the other hand, among the reasons why some credit cooperatives remained not affiliated with 
CFF include: (1) the cooperative is already affiliated with another federation; (2) the cooperative is not 
interested in investing in CFF; (3) the cooperative does not know anything about CFF; (4) dues to be paid 
are quite high; and (5) the cooperative wants s t rengthen and stabilize its operations before joining any 
federation. 
I. Relationship with Banks 
The relationship of credit cooperatives with banks is straightforward. Banks serve as depository 
of credit cooperative funds. Aside from placing savings and time deposits in the banks, these 
cooperatives also obtain checking account services from their depository banks. A number of them 
make use of their checking deposits to encash the checks they issue to their members. Loans in big 
amount are normally released in the form of a check instead of cash. This way, banks are able to help 
the management monitor the flow of cash in the cooperative. Moreover, one credit cooperative which 
accepts pieces of jewelry as collateral also deposits them in its neighboring bank.10 
9. A Central Finance Facility (CFF) is a pool of funds/resources of PFCCI-affiliated primary credit cooperatives. These 
cooperatives can become stockholders in CFF upon payment of the minimum share capital subscription of P5.000, among other 
requirements (i.e., registration, etc.). Should financial needs arise, a primary credit cooperative can borrow three times (3X) the 
value of its share capital in CFF, provided it has been a stockholder for at least two months, at one percent per month or 12 
percent per annum. There is no ceiling on loans that a primary cooperative can obtain from the CFF as long as the loan multiple 
is observed. The primary credit cooperatives will receive at the end of the year dividends on their investments, depending on the 
net income generated by the CFF. 
10. Some banks in the country are allowed by the Central Bank to provide depository boxes to their clients for a 
certain fee. 
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All the credit cooperatives have deposit balances in neighboring banks. Some of them even had 
two to three accounts in different banks. Their savings deposits ranged from P5,000 to P2.69 million, 
while time deposits ranged between P0.5 million and P6.83 million as of the period of survey. The 
average savings deposits with banks of 10 credit cooperatives is P755,239, with an average interest rate 
of 5.32 percent per annum, while the average time deposits of six credit cooperatives is P2,852,240, with 
an average interest rate of 16.42 percent per annum. The interest rates on time deposits varied according 
to maturity period. These are potential resources of the credit cooperatives which they could use for 
interlending scheme. 
J. Relationship with Federation and Other Institutions 
Ten of the credit cooperatives are affiliated with the PFCCI. Most of them became affiliated in 
1988 and 1989. Some of them are also affiliated with other local federations like the Northern Luzon 
Cooperatives Development Center (NLCDC), Bulacan Federation of Credit Cooperatives (BFCC), 
Regional Federation of Credit Cooperatives-Region III (RFCC-Region III), Federation of Credit 
Cooperatives of Negros Occidental (FCCNO), Regional Cooperatives Union (RCU), and Mindanao 
Alliance for Self-Help Society-Southern Philippine Educational Center for Cooperatives (MASS-
SPECC) (Table 13). These federations provide training services to the management staff, members, and 
officers of the primary cooperatives. Specific training is given to managers, accountants, and 
bookkeepers. Leadership training is given to credit cooperative officers. These training courses and 
seminars are either partly or fully funded by the federations. The primary cooperatives normally provide 
the venue for locally conducted seminars. 
The credit cooperatives pay annual dues to the federations, either in fixed amount or depending 
on the size of cooperative membership. In the case of PFCCI, the annual contribution is equivalent to 
P5 for every cooperative member, but not exceeding P10,000 per credit cooperative. 
Only two credit cooperatives have received financial grants/ aid from other institutions and 
agencies. These institutions include the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), which 
provided financial support for small livelihood projects, and the Bureau of Rural Workers of the 
Department of Labor and Employment (BRW-DOLE), which provided technical training on farming 
and related rural activities. The amount of financial assistance varied from P38,086 to P52,000. One 
credit cooperative received non-monetary/non-financial assistance, which included livelihood training 
conducted by the Department of Agriculture, entrepreneurial skills training given by the National 
Manpower and Youth Council, and farmers' organization and federation training given by the PBSP. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
CREDIT COOPERATIVE AFFILIATIONS 
(as of 1989) 
Credit 
Cooperative 
Location No. of Years 
of Application 
TABUK 
NLCDC 
PFCCI 
Baguio 
Manila 
3 
1 
FIL-MER 
PFCCI Manila 1 
SMT 
BFCC 
PFCCI 
RFCC 
Bulacan 
Manila 
Angeles 
2 
1 
2 
BCPST 
FCCNO Bacolod 10 
PACO 
PFCCI Manila 3 
GMA 
PFCCI Manila 5 1/2 
OURLADY 
PFCCI Manila 3 
SMC-MAND 
PFCCI Manila 3 
ISIDORE n.d. 
FICCO 
PFCCI Manila 2 
MSU-HT 
PFCCI 
RCU 
MASS-SPECC 
Manila 
Cotabato 
Cagayan de Oro 
1 
n.d. 
n.d. 
BONGAO 
PFCCI 
MASS-SPECC 
Manila 
Cagayan de Oro 
1 
12 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Managers Survey, 1989. 
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ID. FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE 12 CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
This section analyzes the performance of the 12 credit cooperatives. The analysis focuses on 
quantitative indicators culled from their financial statements. The first part discusses the growth 
performance, while the second part discusses the operations and problems encountered in the growth 
process. 
A. Growth Performance 
All 12 credit cooperatives have noted an impressive expansion in their total nominal assets, at 
an average annual rate of 37 percent during the 1984-1988 period (Table 14). In real terms, however, 
only six of them were able to sustain positive annual growth rates in total assets throughout the period.11 
Four of them were severely hit by high inflation in 1984-1985, but successfully recovered in 1986 and 
sustained their growth in the succeeding years. The average annual real growth rate of the 12 
cooperatives was 26 percent, with eight of them growing at an average rate of 20 percent annually in real 
terms. This impressive growth performance reflects their ability to weather the 1983-1984 economic 
crisis and the management's ability to resolve internal problems to preserve the members' loyalty and 
confidence in the cooperative. 
The increase in fixed deposits, which rose by an average of 37 percent during the period, mainly 
accounted for the growth in total resources of the credit cooperatives. 12This impressive nominal growth 
rate in fixed deposits can be attributed to several reasons. First, there was a continuous expansion in the 
membership of these credit cooperatives, especially among the market vendor- and community-based 
ones. Second, some of the credit cooperatives have launched savings mobilization programs and 
promotional gimmicks, including raffle draws and beauty contests, to expand share capital subscription 
of members. In the case of institution-based credit cooperatives, a "Forced Saving Plan" was 
implemented requiring employee-members to contribute monthly for fixed and savings deposits. This 
was done by automatically deducting a certain amount from their payroll. Third, the cooperatives have 
imposed a loan retention limit from one to five percent per loan transaction to increase the borrower's 
fixed deposit. Five credit cooperatives had loan retention limit of up to five percent. Fourth, some credit 
cooperatives retained a certain percentage of the member's dividend or interest on share capital and 
added it to his/her fixed deposit. One credit cooperative retained at least 25 percent of the annual 
dividends of members. In some cases, the patronage refund was included in the computation of the 
retention. 
Even though fixed deposits have expanded in this period, it appears that their share to total 
resources remained relatively stable for most of the credit cooperatives, and even declined for some. On 
the average, the proportion of fixed deposits to total resources was 57 percent in 1984-1988. This implies 
that the growth of nominal assets was not solely sustained by an increase in fixed deposits. In fact, four 
of the credit cooperatives had average ratios lower than 50 percent. 
11. The real growth rates were computed using the 1972 GNP deflator. 
12. Total resources = total liabilities + total funds + members' equity = total assets. 
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Interestingly, several of them have considered the potential of savings deposits as an alternative 
source of growth in resources. In some of them, the proportion of savings deposits to total assets 
continuously rose throughout the period (Table 15). They were also the ones which have noted a 
reduction in the proportion of fixed deposits to total assets, reflecting a gradual shift of emphasis from 
fixed deposit to savings deposit in sustaining their growth. On the average, the share of savings deposit 
to total resources of the 12 credit cooperatives was 24 percent during the period. Three of them used 
mainly savings deposits to finance the expansion in their resources, while one used both fixed and 
savings deposits. Some credit cooperatives have not considered savings deposits as an important source 
of funds, but once they put emphasis on it they would certainly require new innovations and 
organizational set-up. For instance, servicing deposits and withdrawals on a daily basis would require 
hiring full-time staff. Moreover, new innovations must be introduced to keep low the transaction costs 
associated with deposits and withdrawals. Only one credit cooperative did not accept savings deposit 
from its members. 
Notwithstanding this impressive performance, additional efforts by the credit cooperatives are 
still necessary to mobilize more savings deposits from members. Most of the credit cooperatives are still 
mainly dependent on fixed deposits to finance their lending operations. As shown in Table 16, the ratio 
of their loans to savings deposit is visibly higher than the ratio of loans to fixed deposit. The low levels 
of savings deposit relative to loans outstanding suggest that savings deposits have not been used 
intensively in sustaining their lending activities. The proportion of loans outstanding to total assets has 
remained relatively high during the 1984-1988 period, at an annual average of 78 percent (Table 17). 
But in the case of six credit cooperatives, this ratio had declined in 1988. 
Chart 1 shows the movements of key balance sheet indicators of individual cooperatives. One 
can observe the high correlation between the rise in total resources (TASSETS) and the increase in fixed 
deposits (SHAREK), which shows the growth dependence of credit cooperatives on members' share 
capital. Although some of them began recognizing the potential of savings deposits as an alternative 
source of growth, the level of savings deposits mobilized still remained low relative to fixed deposits. 
Of the 12 credit cooperatives, only four have actively mobilized savings deposits (S AVINGSD) from 
members. These four—especially St. Martin of Tours, First Community, and Notre Dame of Bongao— 
have experienced relatively high growth rates in their nominal assets during the 1984-1988 period. 
Furthermore, Chart 1 also shows the level of the 12 credit cooperatives' loans outstanding (LOANSR) 
which accounted for the bulk of the total resources during the 1984-1988 period. 
Because of the concentration of resources on lending operations, credit cooperatives derive their 
income mainly from interests on loans (Table 18). Interest on loans contributed, on the average, 66 
percent of the gross income of these credit cooperatives. Seven of them even had higher average ratios 
of up to 84 percent. Moreover, in six credit cooperatives, interest on loans alone could sustain interest 
expenses on savings and time deposits of members, and administrative and operating expenses. On the 
average, the ratio of interest on loans to total expenses was 1.3 during the period (Table 19). 
Chart 2 shows the movements of selected income statement accounts of the 12 credit coopera-
tives during the 1984-1988 period. One can observe an increase in gross income (TOTINC), mainly due 
to an increase in interest income on loans. Most of the credit cooperatives have maintained fairly stable 
Table 27 (continuation) 
RATIO TO TOTAL ASSETS OF FIXED AND SAVINGS DEPOSITS 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 
FD 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.76 0.75 
SD 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.02 
BONGAO 
FD 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 
SD 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.67 
FICCCO 
FD 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.44 
SD 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.41 
FIL-MER 
FD n.d. 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 
SD n.d. 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
GMA 
FD 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.61 0.55 
SD 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.14 
ISIDORE 
FD n.d. n.d. 0.74 0.66 0.74 
SD n.d. n.d. 0.09 0.19 0.16 
MSU-IIT 
FD 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.60 
SD 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.11 
OURLADY 
FD 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.18 
SD 0.57 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.65 
PACO 
FD 0.80 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.66 
SD 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.26 
SMC-MAND 
FD 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.87 
SD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SMT 
FD 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.23 
SD 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.43 
TABUK 
FD 0.88 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.71 
SD 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 
n.a. = not applicable (no savings deposit offered) 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
table 16 
LOANS - TO-DEPOSIT RATIOS 
1984 -1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
BONGAO 
464.47 
1. 22 
1.21 
566.44 
1.20 
1.20 
534.19 
1.10 
1.10 
75.53 
1.16 
1.14 
51.65 
1.18 
1.15 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
FICCC0 
0.90 
4 . 78 
0.75 
1. 02 
4.29 
0.82 
0.96 
3 . 37 
0.75 
0.87 
3.14 
0.68 
0.88 
3.32 
0.70 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D* 
FIL-MER 
2.14 
2 .20 
1. 05 
2.47 
2.05 
1.09 
2.11 
1. 69 
0.90 
2.04 
1.86 
0.96 
2.00 
1.87 
0.95 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
GMA 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
38.78 
1. 09 
1.06 
22 . 85 
1. 06 
1.02 
24.13 
1.07 
1.02 
16.65 
1.04 
0.98 
L-SD 
L-FD . 
L-D 
ISIDORE 
16.38 
1. 08 
1.01 
21.75 
1. 10 
1. 04 
19.83 
1.17 
1.10 
12.13 
1.22 
1.11 
5.33 
1.32 
1.06 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
MSU-IIT 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
3.56 
1.03 
0.80 
4.28 
0.90 
0.74 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
OURLADY 
6.18 
1. 04 
0.89 
6.52 
1.11 
0. 95 
7.24 
1. 10 
0.95 
5.36 
0.99 
0.84 
5.22 
0.93 
0.79 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
PACO 
1.30 
5.21 
8.72 
1.06 
4.84 
7.65 
1.12 
4.13 
8.80 
1.15 
5.19 
7.27 
1.22 
4.50 
6.36 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
SMC-MAND 
7.24 
1.11 
0.96 
9.38 
1.10 
0.99 
8.31 
1.23 
1. 07 
5.07 
1.33 
1.05 
3.32 
1.32 
0.94 
L-SD _ 
L-FD 
L-D 
SMT 
1. 09 
1. 09 1. 12 1.12 1.15 1.15 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D* 
TABUK 
1. 98 
3.28 
0.84 
2.10 
3.60 
0. 77 
1.91 
3.72 
0.74 
1.80 
3.58 
0.81 
1.94 
3.69 
0.92 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D* 
10.39 
0.94 
0.85 
12 . 06 
1. 23 
1.10 
11.47 
1.30 
1.14 
16.65 
1.23 
1.13 
9.58 
1.16 
1.00 
n.a. 
n.d. = 
L-SD 
L-FD 
L-D 
Source: 
not applicable (no savings deposit) 
no data available ; * = including time deposit 
Loans-to-savings deposit ratio aeposit 
Loans-to-fixed deposit ratio 
S " ^ ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 0 3 ^ (including time deposit) ecu Forms and Financial Statements, 1984-1988/ ratio 
30 Table 17 
LOANS TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 0.94 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.88 
BONGAO 0.68 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.59 
FICCCO 0.84 0.87 0.76 0.81 0.82 
FIL-MER n.d. 0.89 0.82 0.80 0.75 
GMA 0.77 0.85 0.86 0.75 0.72 
ISIDORE n.d. n.d. n.d. 0.68 0.66 
MSU-IIT 0 . 5 8 0. 65 0.60 0.60 0.56 
OURLADY 0 . 7 4 0.66 0. 69 0.78 0.79 
PACO 0 . 8 9 0 . 9 2 0.92 0.92 0.87 
SMC-MAND 0 . 9 0 0 . 9 2 0.95 0.88 0.91 
SMT 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 0 0. 68 0.75 0.84 
TABUK 0 . 8 3 0 . 9 0 0 . 9 2 0.92 0.83 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: CCU Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
Table 18 
INTEREST ON LOANS TO GROSS INCOME 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 0.87 
BONGAO 0.92 
F1CCCO 0.65 
FIL-MER n.d. 
GMA 0.65 
ISIDORE n.d. 
MSU-DT 0.47 
OURLADY 0.46 
PACO 0.60 
SMC-MAND 0.85 
SMT 0.53 
TABUK 0.65 
0.87 
0.62 
0.57 
0.70 
0.70 
n.d. 
0.42 
0.42 
0.62 
0.85 
0.59 
0.59 
0.84 
0.56 
0.62 
0.69 
0.67 
0.83 
0.02 
0.48 
0.62 
0.83 
0.54 
0.64 
0.81 
0.61 
0.60 
0.70 
0.74 
0.84 
n.d. 
0.51 
0.58 
0.83 
0.96 
0.75 
0.83 
0.58 
0.60 
0.67 
0.71 
0.81 
n.d. 
0.52 
0.57 
0.84 
0.98 
0.77 
n.d. = no data available ; = including time deposit 
Source: Credit Cooperative Forms and Financial Statements, 
1984-1988. 
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Table 19 
INTEREST ON LOANS TO TOTAL EXPENSES 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 2.80 2.18 2.10 2.03 1.92 
BONGAO 1.41 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.97 
HCCCO 1.02 1.07 0.95 1.08 1.10 
FIL-MER n.d. 1.23 1.19 1.42 1.44 
GMA 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.95 1.13 
ISILXDRE n.d. n.d. 0.14 0.13 0.10 
MS'J-HT 1.19 0.81 0.06 n.d. n.d. 
OUKLADY 0.58 0.48 0.54 0.61 0.71 
PACO 1.53 1.16 1.12 0.77 0.61 
SMC-MAND 2.23 2.28 2.38 3.73 3.54 
SMT 0.89 0.83 0.74 0.96 0.98 
TABUK 1.77 2.98 2.93 4.01 4.16 
n.d. = no data.available 
Source: Credi*-Cooparative Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
Table 20 
LOAN DELINQUENCY RATIO 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 
BCPST n.d. n.d. 
BONGAO 0.13 0.15 
FICCCO 0.11 0.11 
FIL-MER n.d. n.d. 
GMA n.d. JUl, 
ISIDORE -n:d. n.d. 
MSU-IIT O.OO 0.00 
OURLADY n.d. n.d. -
PACO n.d. n.d. 
SMC-MAND n.d. n.d. 
SMT 0.15 0.16 
TABUK 0.11 0.17 
1986 1987 1988 
n.d. 
0.08 
0.11 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
0.00 
n.d. 
n.d. 
n.d. 
0.16 
0.11 
n.d. 0.12 
0.09 n.d. 
0.10 0.09 
n.d. n.d. 
n.d. n.d. 
n.d. n.d. 
0.00 0.00 
0.22 n.d. 
0.33 0.47 
n.d. n.d. 
0.17 0.16 
0.12 0.11 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Forms and Financial Statements, 1984-1988! 
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expenditure patterns which sustained a continuous increase in their net incomes (NETINC) throughout 
the period. Only two of them registered a decline in net income during their most recent operations due 
to a surge in operating expenditures, specifically on office equipment and building improvements. 
Moreover, the proportion of interest expenses (1NTEXP), especially on savings deposits (ISAVINGSD) 
of members, to total expenses remained very minimal in most of them. Only one appears to have 
incurred a significant amount of interest expenses on deposits. For purposes of reporting financial 
performance, the use of charts or illustrations can help the credit cooperatives closely monitor and 
manage the flow of expenditures and receipts incurred in the conduct of regular operations. 
B. Operations and Problems 
It appears that only five of the credit cooperatives have loan delinquency problems. Hov ever, 
these credit cooperatives, all community-based, have managed to control the perpetuation of loan 
delinquencies among members through continuous membership education and the implementation of 
penalties for delinquent borrowers. As shown in Table 20, the ratio of overdue loans to loans outstanding 
declined during the recent operations of some credit cooperatives. Only one of them hi*l exhibited 
relatively high loan delinquency ratios in 1987 and 1988. This cooperative did not maintain a full-time 
manager, which posed difficulty in enforcing consistent policies on loan collection and repayment. 
An extra caution, however, should be taken in interpreting the figures on loan delinquency ratios 
in Table 20, especially in those credit cooperatives which have not reported their overdue loans. 
Evidently, some of these cooperatives have not been aging loans according to thetength of time past due. 
Thus, during the survey, these cooperatives encountered difficulties in tracing and summing up overdue 
loans. 
In the case of institution-based credit cooperatives, loan delinquency was practically nil because 
loan repayment is done through payroll deduction which eliminates, or at least reduces, the probability 
of loan delinquency and default. 
Despite the impressive growth rates in nominal assets achieved by the 12 credit cooperatives in 
the past five years, a number of them still have not sustained a continuous increase in their net incomes/ 
savings (Table 21).13 In fact, two of these credit cooperatives have registered negative growth rates of 
net savings during their most recent operations. This was mainly due to a surge in their operating 
expenses, specifically on office improvements and the installation of computer facilities and equipment, 
among others. One credit cooperative with the largest membership found it inevitable to use computers 
to handle a bigger volume of daily transactions. Though the gnJwth fates of their net savings have been 
erratic for some of them, the 12 cooperatives have achieved an average nominal growth rate of 42 percent 
from 1984-1988. 
The net savings of credit cooperatives are generally allocated for cooperative education training 
fund (CETF), general reserve fund patronage refund, and dividends on share capital. The 
allocation is normally stipulated in tlie cooperative's by-laws. To some extent, the allocation may be 
13. Net income and net savings are used synonymously in this paper. 
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Table 22 
NET SAVINGS BEFORE PROVISION 
1984 -1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 316, 774. 02 293,214. 48 329, 818. 96 431,919. 06 435,718. 71 
BONGAO 44, 817. 74 39,874. 77 63, 716. 26 50,443. 65 138,355. 87 
FICCCO 547, 939. 26 876,006. 69 678, 373. 31 1 ,118,831. 30 1 ,595,786. 60 
FIL-MER n. d. 225,086. 57 293, 776. 29 498,372. 95 739,030. 34 
GMA 30, 879. 76 20,458. 89 21, 471. 58 60,614. 00 175,758. 00 ISIDORE n. d. n. d. 37, 827. 12 46,146. 03 49,472. 88 
MSU-IIT 57, 706. 77 59,935. 64 139, 201. 18 174,146. 73 208,239. 01 
OURLADY 197, 313. 00 159,487. 00 140, 661. 00 261,630. 00 435,822. 00 
PACO 18, 451. 67 22,006. 79 41, 315. 64 35,528. 00 10,526. 00 SMC-MAND 147, 876. 94 187,492. 97 244, 876. 36 438,214. 73 900,297. 09 
SMT 1,245, 589. 79 1,442,291. 58 1,805, 625. 93 48,719. 00 33,829. 00 
TABUK 194, 371. 71 852,867. 68 1,477, 176. 13 2 ,400,260. 35 4 ,007,914. 28 
n.d, = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
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influenced by institutions/organizations with which the cooperative is affiliated. For example, a 
Mindanao-based credit cooperative is adopting the allocation method recommended by the Mindanao 
Alliance for Self-Help Society-Southern Philippines Educational Center for Cooperatives (MASS-
SPECC). Nevertheless, allocation of net savings appears to be similar among the 12 credit cooperatives 
in spite of differences in institutional affiliations. 
The 12 credit cooperatives allocated the greatest share of their net savings to patronage refunds 
and dividends on share capital. In most cases, the amount is equivalent to ove. 80 percent of net savings 
after deducting the provisions for CETF and GRF. In dividing the balance of net savings after statutory 
provisions, three credit cooperatives have consistently used 80-20 dividends-patronage refunds alloca-
tion from 1984-1988. By allocating a greater portion of net savings to dividends, these cooperatives in 
effect were encouraging more share capital subscriptions from members. They have made fairly 
attractive the interest on fixed shares by basing the interest on share capital on the dividends that the 
credit cooperative allocates from its net savings. 
On the other hand, some credit cooperatives allocated a bigger portion of net savings to patronage 
refund, indicating their objective of encouraging more borrowings from members. Still, others 
maintained a 50-50 allocation for dividends and patronage refunds. 
The volatility of net savings of these credit cooperatives resulted in erratic growth rates of their 
dividends and patronage refunds (Table 22). A reduction in the net savings before statutory provisions 
also reduced the allocation for dividends and patronage refund. This is because the credit cooperative 
had to satisfy the required provisions for other items (i.e., CETF, GRF, etc.) before the amount of net 
savings to be allocated to dividends and patronage refund can be finally determined. On the average, 
three of the credit cooperatives have registered negative growth rates on dividends and patronage refund 
during the 1984-1988 period. 
There were instances when the allocations for patronage refund and dividends were reduced 
because of the following: (1) the cooperative set aside a certain portion of net savings for developmer* 
fund to finance projects and business ventures; (2) the cooperative allocated for capital investment on 
community loan service (CLS), which are loans to community residents who are non-members of the 
cooperative but are endorsed by the members; and (3) the cooperative set aside for land and building fund 
to finance land acquisition and building improvements. 
The most common statutory provisions that credit cooperatives directly set aside from net 
savings include CETF and GRF. The allocation for CETF is equivalent to 10 percent of net savings, with 
half of the amount retained in the cooperative and the other half remitted to the Cooperative Union of 
the Philippines (CUP). This allocation is intended to finance training and seminars and information 
materials on cooperatives which are given to members, management staff, and officers of the credit 
cooperatives. On the other hand, the allocation for GRF is equivalent to 10 percent of net savings after 
provision for CETF. There were instances, however, when the amount allocated to GRF was raised to 
20 percent, such as when loan losses reached relatively high levels. The amount is intended to absorb 
losses from loan defaults. Thus, credit cooperatives build up reserve fund substantial enough to give 
them security against bad debts. Kilusang Bayan Guarantee Fund (KBGF), on the other hand, was 
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Table 22 
GROWTH RATES OF DIVIDENDS AND PATRONAGE REFUNDS 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 
DIV. (17.72) 12.48 n.d. n.d. 
PAT. (17.72) 12.48 n.d. n.d. 
BONGAO 
DIV. 11.21 n.d. n.d. 118.00 
PAT. 77.94 59.79 (20.83) 371.24 
FICCCO 
DIV. 60.84 (23.15) 66.05 41.29 
PAT. 60.84 (23.15) 66.05 41.29 
FIL-MER 
DIV. 38.64 23.99 60.72 64.77 
PAT. 38.64 23.99 60.72 64.77 
GMA 
DIV. (53.92) 28.94 107.42 195.50 
PAT. (53.92) 28.94 107.42 195.50 
ISIDORE 
DIV. n.d. n.d. (59.33) n.d. 
PAT. n.d. n.d. (76.31) n.d. 
MSU-IIT 
DIV. (1.84) 76.57 68.24 4.52 
PAT. n.d. 106.00 44.20 4.52 
OURLADY 
DIV. 30.49 47.77 19.18 2.02 
PAT. (32.73) 25.45 0.12 186.09 
PACO 
DIV. 30.41 30.61 78.95 105.45 
PAT. n.d. n.d. (15.56) (48.69) 
SMC-MAND 
DIV. 30.41 30.61 78.95 105.45 
PAT. 30.41 30.61 78.95 105.45 
SMT 
DIV. 99.03 (29.48) 125.24 23.73 
PAT. (49.72) 284.71 21.32 55.37 
TABUK 
DIV. 261.50 90.31 62.51 67.63 
PAT. 261.50 90.31 62.51 67.63 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Manager^ Survey, 1989. 
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generally taken from the credit cooperatives' gross income. It is equivalent to one percent. The amount 
is intended to finance expenses associated with social gatherings within the cooperative and among 
cooperatives. 
Only a few of the credit cooperatives were able to maintain a fairly stable return on share capital 
during the 1984-1988 period. Seven of them suffered a slight decline in share capital return despite 
increase in net income levels (Table 23). One credit cooperative exhibited a large reduction in its return 
on share capital because of a decrease in the level of its net savings in 1987 and 1988 when it partly 
computerized its operations for handling loans and deposit transactions. On the other hand, four credit 
cooperatives have sustained an increase in return on share capital during their most recent operations. 
The increase was One mainly to an expansion in their gross income and to effective management of 
operations expenses. On the average, the return on share capital for the 12 credit cooperatives was 15 
percent during the period, which is fairly impressive. This approximates the 17 percent average interest 
rate on fixed deposit during the same period. 
A similar trend can be observed in return on total assets of these credit cooperatives (Table 24). 
But given the rapid expansion in nominal assets and the highly erratic movements in net savings levels, 
the average return on total assets during the period was only seven percent. This is higher than the 
average return on total assets of the rural banking system, which was 1.48 percent during the 1984-1988 
period.14 
C. Summary 
The credit cooperatives which have actively mobilized savings deposits from members have 
noted relatively high growth rates in their total resources. This clearly shows the potential of savings 
deposit as an alternative source of growth. Considering that almost all the credit cooperatives in this 
study have staff working on a full-time basis, savings deposit mobilization may not really be a 
complicated task. The cooperative staff can always extend during official time the services needed to 
process deposits and withdrawals by members. 
In the case of institution- and market vendor-based credit cooperatives, savings deposits can be 
mobilized from members through payroll deduction and collectors, respectively. At the same time, 
offering savings deposit instrument could make credit cooperatives less vulnerable to fluctuations in 
fixed deposits, which can be caused by pressures from loan ceilings or ceilings on share capital 
subscription. 
Credit cooperatives with big membership may experience rising operating costs as a result of an 
intensive mobilization of savings deposits. In this regard, they may pursue cost-reducing innovations, 
such as computerizing their regular transactions. 
14. See Lamberte and Kelampagos (1990). 
Table 27 (continuation) 
RETURN ON SHARE CAPITAL 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 198! 
BCPST 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.14 
BONGAO 0.37 0.26 0.32 0.19 0.40 
FICCCO 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.12 
FIL-MER n.d. 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.14 
GMA 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.13 
ISIDORE n.d. n.d. 0.17 0.16 0.15 
MSU-I1T 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.17 0.16 
OURLADY 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.20 
PACO 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.02 
SMC-MAND 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 
SMT 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.004 0.002 
TAB UK 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.18 
n.d. - no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
Table 24 
RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS 
1984-1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
BCPST 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.11 
BONGAO 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07 
FICCCO 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 
FIL-MER n.d. 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 
GMA 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 
ISIDORE n.d. n.d. p. 13 0.11 0.11 
MSU-IIT 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.09 
OURLADY 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
PACO 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.01 
SMC-MAND 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
SMT 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.0009 0.0005 
TABUK 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.13 0,13 
n.d. = no data available 
Stance: Credit Cooperative Financial Statements, 1984-1988. 
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Although credit cooperatives have posted impressive nominal growth rates in their total 
resources, more prudent management of their expenditures could improve their net income perform-
ance. This is especially true for those cooperatives which have experienced a drastic decline in their net 
incomes during their most recent operations due to a surge in their operating expenditures. Such a 
decline in net income could penalize shareholders and borrowers through a reduction in the dividends 
and patronage refund given to them. 
IV. SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF SAMPLE RESPONDENTS 
A. General Information 
Table 25 shows some characteristics of the 227 member-respondents included in the baseline 
survey. Their average age is 39.9 years. More than 80 percent are married. Females comprise 74.9 
percent, and the sample respondents are mostly non-household heads. This shows that membership in 
the credit cooperative is not limited to one member of the family. Close to 97 percent are regular 
members; the rest are officers. 
There is a fairly high degree of literacy among the sample respondents. More than 80 percent 
of them have obtained at least secondary schooling; 58 percent have pursued college schooling, and a 
number reached post-undergraduate level (i.e., LL.B., M.D., D.M.D., and graduate studies). 
Non-household head respondents are further classified according to their position in the 
household. More than 50 percent are spouses, while the rest are immediate family members (Table 26). 
The average household size is 6.2, approximately the national average. Table 26 also shows the 
disaggregation of household members by age groups as reported by the respondents. More households 
reported having family members, both men and women, within the working age group (15-65 years 
old).15 Based on the total of household members and of working members, the number of dependents 
(those not engaged in any form of livelihood activity) was computed. On the average, there were five 
dependents in each household. 
The respondents' residential characteristics are presented in Table 27. Those residing in single 
houses comprise 78.2 percent, which is 11.5 percentage points below the national proportion.16 Sixty-
three percent own the house and lot, wliich is above the 58.1 percent national proportion in 1985. Most 
residential units are built of strong and light materials, with an average number of 2.8 rooms. Ninety-
three percent of households use electricity for their lighting facility, but only few use the same for 
cooking. Based on the 1985 Family Income and Expenditures Survey, only 57 percent of total 
households in the country have electricity in their homes. Liquified petroleum gas appears to be the 
primary source of fuel for cooking. Moreover, a faucet water system inside the house provides the main 
source of drinking water for 62.2 percent of the sample. 
15. Age group classification based on NSO definition. 
16, Based on the 1985 Family Expenditures and Income Survey, 89.7 percent of the total households in the country resided 
in single houses. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMBER-RESPONDENTS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Age Distribution 
< 20 1 0-4 
21 to 30 37 16.4 
31 to 40 91 40.4 
41 to 50 58 25.8 
51 to 60 31 13.8 
61 to 70 7 3.1 
Total 225 100.0 
Mean = 39.99 
S.D, = 9.90 
B. Sex 
Male 57 25.1 
Female 170 74.9 
Total 227 100.0 
C. Civil Status 
Single 21 9.4 
Married 194 87.0 
Widow/Widower 8 3.6 
Total 223 100.0 
D. Head of Household 
Head 88 39.1 
Other 137 60.9 
Total 225 100.0 
E. Position in the Credit Cooperative 
Member 215 96.8 
Officer 7 3.2 
Total 222 100.0 
F. Educational Attainment 
No Schooling 2 0.9 
Primary 9 4.0 
Intermediate 27 12.0 
Secondary 51 22.7 
Vocational 6 2.7 
College 111 49.3 
LL.B., M.D., D.M.D. 4 1.8 
Graduate Studies 15 6.7 
Total 225 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 26 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Position in the Household (for non-household heads) 
Husband/Wife 125 92.6 
Eldest Child 1 0.7 
Second Child 2 1.5 
Third Child 3 2.2 
Fourth Child 2 1.5 
Others 2 1.5 
Total 135 100.0 
B. Household Size by Age Group 
No. of Households Reporting (Total = 228) 
Men %to Women % to Total % to 
Total Total Total 
Less than 15 130 57.3 108 47.4 164 71.9 
15-65 187 82.4 195 85.5 201 88.2 
Over 65 11 4.8 23 10.1 29 12.7 
Total Household Members 
1 - 2 9 4.4 
3 - 4 45 21.8 
5 - 6 72 35.0 
7 - 8 49 23.8 
9 - 10 16 7.8 
11 - 12 10 4.9 
13-14 3 1.5 
15-16 1 0.5 
> 16 1 0.5 
Total 206 100.0 
Mean = 6.20 
S.D. = 2.65 
Number of Dependents1 
1 - 2 16 11.5 
3 - 4 48 34.5 
5 - 6 44 31.7 
7 - 8 20 14.4 
9 - 10 7 5.0 
>10 4 2.9 
Total 139 100.0 
Mean = 4.99 
S.D. = 2.48 
'Total household members less number of members working. 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF RESIDENTIAL UNITS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Type of Unit -
Single 176 78.2 
Duplex 15 6.7 
Apartment 19 8.4 
Improvised 11 4.9 
Hospital 4 1.8 
Total 225 100.0 
B. Housing Materials 
Strong 93 42.1 
Light 73 33.0 
Salvaged/Makeshift 3 1.4 
Mixed/Strong 35 15.8 
Mixed/Light 14 6.3 
Mixed/Salvaged 1 0.5 
Combination 2 0.9 
Total 221 100.0 
C. Tenure Status 
Own or owner-like possession of 141 63.2 
house and lot 
Rent house and lot 28 12.6 
Own house, rent lot 18 8,1 
Own house, rent-free lot with 23 10.3 
consent of owner •s 
Own house, rent-free lot without 1 0.4 
consent of owner 
Rent free house & lot with 11 4.9 
consent of owner 
Rent free house & lot without 1 0.4 
consent of owner 
Total 223 100.0 
Table 27 (continuation) 
No. of Observations Percent 
D. Number of Rooms in the House 
1 99 46.3 
3 90 42.1 
5 21 9.8 
7 3 1.4 
>10 1 0.5 
Total 214 100.0 
E. Type of Lighting Facility 
Electricity 207 92.8 
kerosene Lamp 10 4.5 
Combination 6 2.6 
Total 223 100.0 
F. Fuel Used in Cooking 
Coal 5 2.2 
Wood 38 17.0 
Kerosene 17 7.6 
Gas 63 28.3 
Electricity 18 8.1 
Sawdust 7 3.1 
Combination 75 33.6 
Total 223 100.0 
G. Source of Drinking Water 
Faucet/Inside 138 62.2 
Faucet/Others 25 11.3 
Well/Own Use 40 18.0 
Well/Others 11 5.0 
Dug Well 1 0.5 
Rain 4 1.8 
Combination 3 1.5 
Total 222 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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The most common household appliances owned by the respondents include radios, television 
sets, refrigerators, sewing machines, and stereos, in that order. Very few own cars and other types of 
vehicle. In Table 28, the proportions of the sample who reported owning household conveniences-— 
specifically radio, television set, and refrigerator—are much higher than the national percentages.17 
Thus, it appears that the sample households generally enjoy above average standard of living. 
B. Occupation and Income 
Wage-earners comprise the biggest portion of the sample. These include salaried employees/ 
laborers working in government and private offices, farms, hospitals and clinics, and school teachers 
from both public, private, and state institutions. Thus, it appears that a significant proportion of credit 
cooperative members have stable sources of income. Eighty-six percent of them were employed for 
the past 12 months, but on the average, salaried workers were employed for 11.4 months as of the period 
of survey. The annual income from main occupation averaged P40,457, which is above the national 
average family income from main occupation of P39,728. 18 From Table 29, it can be observed that 
more than 60 percent of the salaried workers have income of at least P24,000 annually, or about P2,000 
a month. 
Merchant traders also account for a significant proportion of the sample, comprising 26.3 
percent. Most of them are engaged in retail trade, but some are large-scale businessmen with gross 
income of as much as P6 million in the past 12 months. This shows that credit cooperative membership 
is not only limited to low-income groups, which is not surprising since most of the credit cooperatives 
operate in communities with heterogenous residents in terms of livelihood and living standards. 
Apparently, these cooperatives have given the community residents equal access to membership 
privileges regardless of their economic status. After incorporating business-related expenses, the net 
income of businessmen-respondents averaged P48,943 (Table 30). 
C. Household Status 
Several members of the family contribute to household income. As shown in Table 31, 70.1 
percent of the households have two or more members who have some form of livelihood. This is 
important since each income-earning individual in the community is a potential credit cooperative 
member. On the average, aside from the respondents themselves, there are 1.5 percent other household 
members who are earning, aside from the respondents. These are typically the spouses of married 
respondents, and parents of unmarried ones. Their total aiyiual income range from P500 to P900,000, 
with an average of P55,089. Thus, these household members contribute significantly to total household 
income,19 
17. Of the total households in the country, 69.9 percent own radio, 3Q.4 percent own television set, and 20.3 percent 
own refrigerator (FIES 1985). 
18. Based on the Family Income and Expenditures Survey, 1988 (preliminary table). 
19. These other income-earning household members include the household heads considering that the sample 
respondents comprised mainly of non-household heads. This explains the relatively high average annual income of the entire 
household. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
APPLIANCES / OTHER ITEMS OWNED 
No. of Households Percent 
Radio 201 88.1 
Watch 182 79.8 
Television Set 173 75.9 
Sewing Machine 111 48.7 
Bicycle 73 32.0 
Refrigerator 146 64.0 
Cai 33 14.5 
Stereo 102 44.7 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 27 (continuation) 
OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Main Occupation 
Salaried Office Employee 77 36.8 
Salaried Farm Employee 2 1.0 
Farmer 17 8.1 
Fisherman 1 0.5 
Merchant Trader 55 26.3 
Artisan 2 1.0 
Salaried Hospital/Clinic Employee 2 1.0 
School Teacher 35 16.7 
Self-Employed 5 2.4 
Others 13 6.3 
Total 209 100.0 
B. Number of Months Working 
1 - 5 months 9 5.1 
6-11 months 15 8.6 
12 months and above 152 86.3 
Total 176 100.0 
Mean = 11.42 
S.D. = 2.87 
C. Total Annual Income from Main Occupation (Pf) 
< 12,000 
12,001 - 24,000 
24,001 - 36,000 
36,001 - 48,000 
48,001 - 60,000 
60,001 - 72,000 
72,001 - 84,000 
84,001 - 96,000 
96,001 -108,000 
> 108,000 
Total 
Mean = 40,456.67 
S.D. = 39,411.77 
38 
29 
47 
23 
15 
7 
1 
4 
2 
13 
179 
21.2 
16.2 
26.3 
12.8 
8.4 
3.9 
0.6 
2.2 
1.1 
7.3 
100.0 
Source: CCU Members Survey, 1989 
Table 30 
NATURE OF BUSINESS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Type of Business 
Retail/Trade 44 69.8 
Transportation/Trucking/ 
Gasoline Station 1 1.6 
Food Manufacturing 1 1,6 
Clothing/Garments 1 i.g 
Housing/Real Estate 1 1.6 
Food Services 3 4.8 
Farming/Fishing 1 1.6 
Non-Food Services 5 7 9 
Others 6 9.5 
Total 63 100.0 
B. Total Gross Income from Business (P/) 
<5,000 1 1.6 
5,000 - 50,000 25 41.0 
50,001 - 100,000 16 26.2 
100,001 -200,000 6 9.8 
200,001 -300,000 7 11.5 
300,001 -400,000 2 3.3 
400,001 -500,000 1 1.6 
500,001- 1,000,000 2 3.3 
Above 1,000,000 1 1.6 
Total 61 100.0 
Mean = 225,110.82 
S.D. = 775,466.82 
Table 30 (continuation) 
No. of Observations Percent 
C. Total Expenses from Business (P/) 
< 2,250 7 12.6 
2,250 - 50,000 27 48.2 
50,001-100,000 13 23.2 
100,001 -200,000 4 7.1 
200,001 -300,000 1 1.8 
300,001 -400,000 1 1.8 
400,001 -500,000 1 1.8 
500,001-1,000,000 2 3.6 
Total 56 100.0 
Mean = 83,719.29 
S.D. = 157,679.85 
D. Net Income from Business (P/) 
< 12,000 19 32.8 
12,001 - 24,000 4 6.9 
24,001 - 36,000 12 20.7 
36,001 - 48,000 3 5.2 
48,001 - 60,000 7 12.1 
60,001- 72,000 3 5.2 
84.000 - 96,000 1 1.7 
96.001 -108,000 1 1.7 
> 108,000 8 13.8 
Total 58 100.0 
Mean = 48,942.76 
S.D. = 55,642.16 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 31 
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WORKING 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Other Household Members Working 
With 150 70.1 
Without 64 29.9 
Total 214 100.0 
B. Number of Other Household Member Working 
1 107 72.3 
2 20 13.5 
3 13 8.8 
4 5 3.4 
5 3 2.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Mean = 1.49 
S.D. = 0.94 
C. Total Annual Income of Other Members (P/) 
< 12,000 16 12.2 
12,001-24,000 28 21.4 
24,001 - 36,000 26 19.8 
36,001 - 48,000 17 13.0 
48,001 - 60,000 13 9.9 
60,001 - 72,000 10 7.6 
72,001 -84,000 4 3.1 
84,001 -96,000 4 3.1 
96,001 -108,000 3 2.3 
> 108,000 10 7.6 
Total 131 100.0 
Mean = 55,089.42 
S.D. = 88,366.22 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Very few (15.1%) of the respondents received financial assistance for the past 12 months prior 
to the survey (Table 32). The average amount they received was P89,164, mostly from friends and 
relatives residing abroad. The financial assistance includes remittances of relatives working overseas. 
Some of the respondents also received financial assistance from friends and relatives residing within the 
country. 
Table 33 shows the distribution of total household income, the annual average of which is 
P85/782, although close to 20 percent of the households have annual income of at least P100,000.20 On 
the other hand, total household expenditure averaged P51,239 per annum (Table 34). Over 45 percent 
of this is spent on food. Education is the second major expenditure, followed by expenditures on fuel, 
light, and water. Expenses for house and land rental are minimal as most households own the house and 
lot they occupy. 
Table 35 shows the respondents' annual total household saving, which is derived by subtracting 
total household expenditure from total household income. On the average, annual household saving was 
P37,213. This indicates the saving potential of households which could be tapped by the credit 
cooperatives. 
D. Respondents' Profile Upon Joining the Credit Cooperative 
Table 36 shows the profile of respondents when they joined their respective credit cooperatives. 
Their average age was 34.1 years. Close to 79 percent of them were married and had an average of 3.4 
children. Roughly 50 percent of the respondents who were single when they first joined the cooperative 
were now married during the period of survey. 
Upon application for membership, the majority (50.8%) of the respondents were salaried 
workers, mostly office employees/ laborers and school teachers, while one-fourth (25.4%) were 
merchant traders/businessmen. Apparently, a significant portion of the membership has stable sources 
of income. A number of respondents (8.6%) also earned livelihood from farming. Upon joining the 
credit cooperative, the respondents' average annual income from their main occupation was P35,486. 
The proportion of those who were unemployed or did not have some form of livelihood upon joining 
the cooperative was minimal. Although the credit cooperatives admit non-working members, it appears 
that they attract mostly income-earning members. Some credit cooperatives grant associate membership 
to students, but this type of membership could not avail of borrowing privileges. 
Upon joining the credit cooperative, more than two-fifths of the sample claimed about two 
members of the household were working. On the average, there were 1.9 household members earning 
a living. In most instances, these were the respondents themselves and their spouses. Several of them 
were sole earner of the household upon joining the cooperative. Total annual household income 
averaged P64,444. 
20. The financial assistance received by the households of the sample respondents for the past 12 months have been 
included in the computation of the annual household income. 
Table 32 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
No. of Observations Percent 
A- Revised Financial Assistance 
Received 32 15. l 
Did not receive 180 84.9 
Total 212 100.0 
B. Sources of Financial Assistance 
Friends/relatives residing abroad 20 64.5 
Friends/relatives residing in M.M. 3 9.7 
Friends/relatives residing in other 
cities in the country 3 9.7 
Friends/relatives residing in other 
town of the country 3 9.7 
Others 2 6.4 
Total 31 100.0 
C. Amount of Financial Assistance 
<5,000 18 62.0 
5,001 - 10,000 4 138 
10,001-20,000 1 3 4 
20,001 -30,000 1 3 4 
30,001 -40,000 2 6 8 
>50,000 3 10.3 
Total 29 100.0 
Mean = 86,164.14 
S.D. = 370,286.33 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Table 56 
ANNUAL TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME (p-) 
No. of Observations Percent 
< 25,000 38 
25,001 - 50,000 49 
50,001 - 75,000 43 
75,001 - 100,000 29 
100,001 -125,000 11 
125,001 -150,000 7 
150,001 -175,000 4 
175,001 - 200,000 5 
200,001 - 225,000 2 
225,001 - 250,000 2 
250,001 - 275,000 1 
> 300,000 6 
Total 197 
Mean = 85,782.83 
S.D. = 163,659.82 
19.3 
24.9 
21.8 
14.7 
5.6 
3.6 
2.0 
2.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.5 
3.0 
100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 34 
AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES BY ITEM 
No. of 
Observations 
Food 
House/Land Rental 
House/Land Amortization 
Fuel, Light and Water 
Clothing, Footwear, etc. 
Education 
Furnishings & Furniture 
House Maintenance & Repair 
Medical Care 
Transportation 
Other Expenses 
Total Expenditures 
Average 
Expenditures 
(P) 
Proportion 
to Total 
(%) 
195 23,121.34 45.1 
195 1,523.12 3.0 
195 1,233.61 2.4 
195 5,031.38 9.8 
195 4,858.41 9.5 
195 5,802.08 11.3 
195 2,875.03 5.6 
195 2,470.77 4.8 
195 2,436.94 4.7 
195 2,892.83 5.6 
195 1,556.59 3.0 
195 51,239.49 100.0 
Source: Crjedit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989, 
Table 35 
ANNUAL TOTAL HOUSEHOLD SAVING 
No. of Observations Percent 
None 52 29.1 
^ 1,000 5 2.8 
> 1,000 - 10,000 22 12.3 
> 10,000 - 20,000 17 9.5 
> 20,000 - 30,000 22 12.3 
>30,000-40,000 18 10.1 
> 40,000 - 50,000 6 3.3 
> 50,000 - 60,000 9 5.0 
>,60,000 - 70,000 3 1.7 
> 70,000 - 80,000 7 3.9 
>80,000-90,000 7 3.9 
>90,000 11 6.1 
179 100.0 
Mean = 37,212.70 
S.D. = 142,246.02 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 42 
RESPONDENT STATUS UPON JOINING THE CREDIT COOPERATIVE 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Age 
20 and below 8 3.8 
21-30 79 37.3 
31-40 78 36.8 
41-50 35 16.5 
51-60 11 5.2 
61-70 1 0.5 
Total 212 100.0 
Mean = 34.07 
S.D. = 9.32 
B. Main Occupation 
Salaried office employee/laborer 104 49.8 
Salaried farm employee/laborer 2 1.0 
Farmer 18 8.6 
Fisherman 1 0.5 
Merchant Trader 53 25.4 
Artisan 3 1.4 
Salaried hospital employee 2 1.0 
School teacher 18 8.6 
Self-employed 4 1.9 
Ordinary laborer 1 0.5 
Others 3 1.5 
Total 209 100.0 
C. Civil Status 
Single 41 18.3 
Married 176 78.6 
Widow/Widower 7 3.1 
Total 224 100.0 
D. Number of Children 
0 8 4.5 
1 - 2 63 35.6 
3 - 4 57 32.2 
5 - 6 29 16.4 
7 - 8 14 7.9 
9 - 10 4 2.3 
11-12 2 1.1 
Total 177 100.0 
Mean = 3.45 
S.D. = 2.29 
Table 36 (continuation) 
No. of Observations Percent 
E. Number of Working Members 
0 1 0.5 
1 - 2 170 83.7 
3 -4 29 14.3 
>4 3 1.5 
Total 203 100.0 
Mean = 1.90 
S.D. = 1.21 
F. Annual Income from Main Occupation 
< 12,000 44 25.6 
12,001 -24,000 41 22.8 
24,001 - 36,000 37 20.6 
36,001 - 48,000 18 10.0 
48,001 - 60,000 15 8.3 
60,001 - 72,000 7 3.9 
72,001-84,000 3 1.7 
84,001 - 96,000 3 1.7 
96,001-108,000 4 2.2 
> 108,000 6 3.3 
Total 178 100.0 
Mean = 35,485.73 
S.D. = 44,449.56 
G. Total Annual Household Income 
< 1,000 1 0.6 
1,000 - 20,000 32 17.7 
20,001 - 40,000 55 30.4 
40,001 - 60,000 26 14.4 
60,001 - 80,000 29 16.0 
80,001 - 100,000 11 6.1 
100,001 - 150,000 11 6.1 
150,001 - 200,000 8 4.4 
>200,000 8 4.4 
Total 181 100.0 
Mean = 64,443.68 
S.D. = 69,928.48 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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An increase in the current total household income from the time the respondents joined the 
cooperatives has been observed. The average increase was P27,683. As shown in the next chapter, this 
increase in household income also increased the respondents' fixed deposits by an average of P4,586 
from the time they joined their credit cooperatives. 
E. Profile of Respondents Engaged in Farming 
Thirty of the respondents are engaged in farming. They include those who, aside from their main 
occupation, have considered farming as an additional source of income. Table 37 shows the average 
farm size and value of production by type of crops. Twenty-five of the farmer-respondents are involved 
in rice farming, with an average production value of P43.922 for the past 12 months prior to the survey. 
Further, 25 respondents also own/raise animals. Table 38 shows the average number of animals 
by type raised for the past 12 months. Swine and poultry raising are the most common, though a number 
of respondents also own carabaos used in traditional farming. 
Very few of the farmer respondents own and use a four-wheel tractor in farming, but 19 of them 
use two-wheel hand tractors. Other farm implements and inputs include assorted tools (i.e., axe, bolo, 
etc.) and seed (palay) (Table 39). Ten of them own the land they cultivate, with an average value of 
PI 52,316, approximately. The others are share tenants, amortizing owners, and cultivators for absentee 
landlords (Table 40). 
Some farmer-respondents are engaged in other means of livelihood to augment their income 
from farming. Table 41 shows the nature of other sources of income of nine farmer-respondents, with 
an average earnings of P14,415 during the past 12 months. 
F. Summary 
Based on the information on household income, expenditures, residential status, and amenities, 
the sample is generally composed of households with above average standard of living. These 
households have greater potential to save. The credit cooperatives could play an important role in 
mobilizing these potential household savings. Since the credit cooperatives, as pointed out earlier, 
impose a ceiling on the maximum amount of loan per single borrower, this may restrict the members' 
willingness to voluntarily increase their fixed deposits. Thus, offering other deposit instruments, such 
as savings and time deposits, may encourage them to save their surplus funds in the credit cooperative. 
Likewise, the present practice by some cooperatives of mobilizing deposits through such programs and 
promotional gimmicks as Tipid Movement, Forced Saving Plan, raffle draws, beauty contests, etc., can 
be considered effective in mobilizing the surplus resources of members. Lastly, the management can 
effectively encourage more share capital subscription if it relaxes its loan ceiling policy. 
Table 37 
FARM SIZE AND VALUE OF PRODUCTION 
Average Farm Size (ha) 
Crops 
Average Value of 
Irrigated Unirrigated Production (P) 
Rice 3.22 1.5 43,922.4 
Corn 0.50 - n.d. 
Coconut 2.67 - 1,192 
Peanut 3.00 - n.d. 
Vegetables 4.00 - n.d. 
n.d. = no data available 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 38 
ANIMALS/POULTRY OWNED 
Average 
Type 
Minimum Maximum 
Carabaos 1 2 
Cows 1 1 
Hogs/Pigs 3 9 
Goats 1 1 
Chickens 7 17 
Ducks 7 11 
Turkey 2 3 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Table 39 
FARM INPUTS AND EQUIPMENT 
A. Farm Equipment and Machineries 
Type Average No. Average Resale Value Per Unit 
4-WheeI Tractor 1 P 18,000.00 
Hand Tractors 1 P 25,000.00 
Assorted Tools 2 P 200.00 
B. Other Farm Inputs 
Type Average Sale Value 
Seed (Palay) P 1,800.00 
Palay P 11,185.00 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 40 Table 41 
CULTIVATED LAND ARRANGEMENT OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME OF 
FARMER-RESPONDENTS 
Arrangement No. of. Percent = 
Observations Nature No. of Observations Percent 
Owner 10 34.5 
Amortizing Owner 3 10.3 Passenger Jeepney 1 11.1 
Share Tenant 6 20.7 Piggery/Poultry 1 11.1 
Others 10 34.5 Retail Trade 4 44.4 
2 9 — Canteen/Carinderia 1 11.1 
Sound System Service 1 11.1 
Average Value of Land Dry Goods Store 1 11.1 
for Owners (Approximate) P 152,315.79 9 100.0 
Average Income = P 14,415.55 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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V. BORROWING AND SAVING PATTERNS 
A. Saving in the Credit Cooperatives 
The most commonly cited reason for joining a credit cooperative is to have access to credit. 
Almost 50 percent of the respondents had this motivation when they joined their respective credit 
cooperatives (Table 42). Interestingly, several respondents seemed to have a wider vision of 
membership in the cooperative. They believed that it is through the credit cooperatives that they could 
manifest their personal contribution to national economic growth. Others had a more philantrophic 
perspective, which was to help the other members. 
Less than 10 percent of the respondents cited saving as a motivating f|>rce in membership. This 
is ironic since the primary goal of credit cooperatives is to encourage saving and thrift among its 
members. 
The majority of the respondents started with an initial fixed deposit of P500 and less. In most 
cases, credit cooperatives require a very minimal share capital subscription in order to encourage more 
membership. However, a number of respondents have also put up a substantial initial fixed deposit of 
over P5,000, with the highest share capital subscription of P40,000. The average initial fixed deposit 
placed by the respondents was P2,386 (Table 43). On the other hand, Table 44 shows the outstanding 
fixed deposits of the respondents during the period of survey. Comparing Tables 43 and 44, one can 
observe an upward movement in the fixed deposits of most respondents. 
As of the period of survey, the proportion of respondents who have fixed deposits of P500 and 
less was reduced to 8.3 percent from the initial 54.9 percent. Moreover, there is an increase in the 
proportion of those who have fixed deposit of at least P5,000, and the highest share capital subscription 
has already reached P80,000. This indicates the members' continuous saving in the cooperative which 
could have been facilitated and accelerated through savings mobilization programs. The average 
outstanding fixed deposit at the time of survey was P6,880. However, the rate of increase in annual terms 
throughout the period of membership appears slow. Given an average membership period of 5.9 years, 
and the average increase in fixed deposits of P4,586, the member-respondents increased their fixed 
deposit balances at an average of P775 per annum. 
Aside from fixed deposits, most credit cooperatives offer savings deposits. However, of the 227 
respondents, only 116 (51%) have savings deposits. Of these 116 respondents, roughly 35 percent 
regularly made monthly deposits, while 16 percent had more frequent deposit transactions of more than 
once a month (Table 45). On the average, the minimum and maximum savings deposits made during 
the past 12 months were P769 and P2,533, respectively. On the other hand, the average minimum and 
maximum outstanding savings deposits were P3,053 and P6,165, respectively. These are comparable 
with the respondents' initial and outstanding fixed deposits, and are indicative of the members' 
willingness to save larger amounts in the credit cooperatives. 
The respondents were asked to compare the interest rates on savings deposits between the credit 
cooperative and the bank. Thirty-one percent claimed that cooperative interest rates were higher than 
Table 42 
REASONS FOR JOINING THE CREDIT COOPERATIVE 
No. of 
Observations Percent 
•To save and earn 
To be able to borrow 
As a condition for membership in 
other associations 
To be able to help other members 
in the credit union 
Asked to join by other members 1/ 
officers of the credit union 
For. national economic growth 
Others (combination) 
Total 
17 
97 
4 
26 
10 
28 
24 
8.3 
47.1 
1.9 
12.6 
4.9 
13.6 
11.6 
206 100.0 
1/ Household consumption includes expenditures on education, household repairs, medical, & other emergency needs. 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 43 
INITIAL FIXED DEPOSIT (P) 
Fixed Deposits No. of Obs. Percent 
500 113 54.9 501 1,000 21 10.2 1,001 - 1,500 8 3.9 1,501 - 2,000 5 2.4 2,001 - 2,500 5 2.4 2,501 - 3,000 11 5.3 3,001 - 3,500 3 1.5 3,501 - 4,000 1 0.5 4,001 - 4,500 1 0.5 4,501 - 5,000 12 5.8 5,001 - 10,000 17 8.3 10,001 - 50,000 9 4.4 
. Total 206 100.0 
Mean = 2,386.34 
S.D. = 4,387.85 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 42 
OUTSTANDING FIXED DEPOSIT (P) 
Fixed Deposits No. of Obs. Percent 
< 500 17 8.3 
501 - 1,000 18 8.7 
1,001 - 1,500 17 8.3 
1,501 - 2,000 22 10.7 
2,001 - 2,500 14 6.8 
2,501 - 3,000 14 6.8 
3,001 - 3,500 8 3.9 
3,501 - 4,000 5 2.4 
4,001 - 4,500 4 1.9 
4,501 - 5,000 15 7.3 
5,001 - 10,000 36 17.5 
10,001 - 50,000 32 15.5 
> 50,000 4 1.9 
Total 206 100.0 
Mean = 6,880.03 
S.D. = 10,682.28 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 42 
SAVINGS DEPOSIT IN THE CREDIT COOPERATIVE, PAST 12 MONTHS 
No. of Observations Percent 
Frequency 
Once only 24 21.6 Twice/thrice 28 25.2 Once a month 39 35.1 Less than one month 18 16.2 Never 2 1.8 
Total 111 100.0 
Minimum Savings Deposit Made (P) 
< 500 85 82.5 501 - 1,000 5 4.9 1,001 - 1,500 2 1.9 1,501 - 2,000 1 1.0 2,001 - 2,500 1 1.0 2,501 - 5,000 6 5.8 5,501 - 10,000 2 1.9 > 10,000 1 1.0 
Total 103 100.0 
Mean = 769.22 S.D. = 2,012.63 
Maximum Savings Deposit Made (?) 
< 500 49 49.5 501 - 1,000 14 14.1 1,001 - 1,500 3 3.0 1,501 - 2,000 6 6.1 2,001 - 2,500 4 4.0 2,501 - 5,000 10 10.1 5,501 - 10,000 8 8.1 > 10,000 5 5.1 
Total 99 100.0 
Mean .= 2*532.87 S.D. = 4,602.60 
Minimum Outstanding Savings Deposits (P) 
< 500 46 49.5 501 - 1,000 11 11.8 1,001 - 1,500 4 4.3 1,501 - 2,000 2 2.2 2,001 - 2,500 6 6.5 2,501 - 5,000 6 6.5 5,501 - 10,000 11 11.8 > 10,000 7 7.5 
Total 93 100.0 Mean = 3,053.52 S.D. = 5,595.16 
Table 45 (cont'd) 
No. of Obs. Percent 
E. Maximum Outstanding Savings Deposits (F) 
< 500 18 18.4 
501 - 1,000 9 9.2 
1,001 - 1,500 1 1.0 
1,501 - 2,000 6 6.1 
2,001 - 2,500 6 6.1 
2,501 - 5,000 19 19.4 
5,501 - 10,000 19 19.4 
> 10,000 20 20.4 
Total 98 100.0 
Mean = 6,164.71 
S.D. 7,446.24 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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bank rates, 29 percent claimed otherwise, 15 percent considered the interest rates the same for both 
institutions, and the rest did not know the difference. The figures indicate a relatively high level of 
awareness among the members of the returns on savings deposits in different institutions. It appears, 
though, that the perception regarding the interest rates on savings deposits in the credit cooperatives and 
the banks differs between the management and membership. Most of the officers/management of these 
cooperatives claimed that their savings deposit rates were either similar to or higher than the observed 
bank rate (Chapter II). Only one credit cooperative claimed that its interest rate was lower than the 
observed bank rate. 
Moreover, more respondents considered the opening of classes in June and the Christmas season 
as periods of heavy withdrawals. Thus, credit cooperatives should be able to effectively project cash 
inflow and outflow during these periods by balancing loan approvals and the available loanable funds. 
For liquidity management purposes, the credit cooperatives may diversify their portfolios by placing a 
portion of their surplus funds on short-term maturity investments that earn attractive rates of return (i.e., 
time deposits, etc.) and which can be terminated and withdrawn during periods of high demand for loans. 
Likewise, the concept of pooled cooperative resources, such as the Central Finance Facility from where 
deficit cooperatives can borrow, may help in cooperative liquidity management. 
The respondents were further asked to compare the safety of deposits in, and the accessibility of, 
their credit cooperative vis-a-vis the bank they know in their area. The results showed that 69 percent 
considered their credit cooperative more accessible than the bank, and 54 percent believed that their 
savings deposits were safer in the cooperative. 
Table 46 shows the time and cost involved in depositing in the cooperative. The majority 
(86.1%) of respondents spent 30 minutes and less in round trip travel time every time they performed 
a deposit transaction. On the average, each round trip took 21 minutes, roughly indicating the 
accessibility of the credit cooperative office. More time, however, is spent in completing the deposit 
transaction in the credit cooperative. The average is 38.7 minutes. This length of time, however, 
depends on the volume of deposit transactions being processed by the credit cooperatives on the same 
day. Besides, most of them have not yet computerized their operations, thus, processing a deposit 
transaction takes some time, especially in the case of bigger cooperatives where there are expectedly 
more deposit transactions being processed. A number of respondents do not commute as the credit 
cooperative is just a walking distance away from their houses. Similarly, very few of them incur out-
of-pocket expenses. On the average, the transportation cost per round trip and other out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred are PI.82 and P0.95, respectively. 
B. Borrowing from the Credit Cooperative 
Mostofthe respondents obtained their most recent loan in 1988 and 1989. The amount ranged 
from P500 to P127,000. The average loan size was P17/743, which is much higher than the average loan 
size of P4,040 reported for the informal sector in a nationwide survey.21 It can be observed that the 
average loan size is approximately 2.5 times higher than the average value of the respondents' 
21. Sec Agabin et al. (1989). 
Table 46 
TIME AND COST IN DEPOSITING IN THE CREDIT COOPERATIVE 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Travel Time (minutes) 
< 10 52 59.7 
> 10 - 20 13 14.9 
> 20 - 30 10 11.5 
> 30 - 40 2 2.3 
> 40 - 50 6 6.9 
> 50 - 60 4 4.6 
Total 87 100.0 
Mean = 21.21 
S.D. = 28.86 
B. Time to Complete Transaction in the Cooperative (minutes) 
< 10 27 31.8 
> 1 0 - 2 0 12 14.1 
> 2 0 - 3 0 18 21.2 
> 3 0 - 4 0 2 2.4 
> 4 0 - 5 0 8 9.4 
> 5 0 - 6 0 11 12.9 
> 6 0 7 8.2 
Total 85 100.0 
Mean = 38.72 
S.D. = 48.96 
C. Transportation Cost (P) 
0 38 38.0 
> 0 - 2.00 41 41.0 
> 2 . 0 0 - 4 . 0 0 14 14.0 
>4.00 -6.00 5 5.0 
> 6 . 0 0 2 2 . 0 
Total 100 100.0 
Mean = 1.82 
S.D. = 2.18 
D. Other Out-of-Pocket Cost (P) 
0 71 89.9 
> 2 . 0 0 - 5 . 0 0 2 2.5 
> 5.00 - 10.00 5 6.3 
> 10.00 1 1.3 
Total 79 100.0 
Mean = 0 . 9 5 
S.D. = 3.92 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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outstanding fixed deposits, indicating an average loan multiple of 2.5. The average loan maturity is 15.6 
months, with most of the loans maturing in one year or less. Each installment payment averaged PI ,805, 
while interest charges ranged from six percent to 36 percent per annum. The average interest rate on 
loans is 15.1 percent per annum (Table 47). 
The respondents were asked to compare the interest rates on credit cooperative loans with those 
on bank loans. Of the 181 respondents, 63 percent claimed that cooperative loan rates were lower, six 
percent claimed otherwise, nine percent considered the rates the same for both institutions, and the rest 
did not know the difference. Those who answered higher noted an average difference of six percentage 
points, while those who answered lower noted 7.46 percentage points. Similarly, the interest rates on 
cooperative loans were compared with the interest rates on loans from moneylenders. The majority 
believed that the cooperative loan rates were lower than those charged by the moneylenders. 
Twenty-three percent of the 186 respondents were required to present collaterals for the last loan 
they obtained from the credit cooperatives. The collaterals were mostly chattel and land, with an average 
value of P43,734. As mentioned in the previous chapter, collaterals were only required when the amount 
applied for was deemed very high. 
The processing of loan applications usually takes several days before the loan is finally released. 
Sixty percent of the respondents waited for more than a week before they were able to obtain their most 
recent loan. On the average, the duration from the submission of loan application to loan disbursement 
is 10 days (Table 48). Delays in loan releases are due to the following: (1) scheduling of loan 
disbursement according to the availability of funds; (2) a very rigid process of screening loan 
application; and (3) processing of numerous loan application at one time considering that even repeat 
borrowers with good track records are required to pass through the same screening policy as new 
borrowers. 
Forty percent of the respondents followed up their loan application through personal visits to the 
credit cooperative. The average number of personal visits was three, with each visit taking an average 
of 1.7 hours, including travel time and discussion. Respondents incurred transportation costs every time 
they visited the credit cooperative, although 27.4 percent of them went to the cooperative office by 
walking. But only a few incurred additional out-of-pocket expenses in following up their loan 
applications. Transportation cost and out-of-pocket expenses averaged P3.48 and P0.48, respectively 
(Table 49). 
The majority (89.4%) received the loan on the time they needed it most. The rest just waited until 
their loans were finally released. However, out of 175 respondents, 15 percent did not receive the full 
amount as specified in their loan applications. The amount received was lower by an average of 31 
percent. This loan reduction was due to the following: (1) there were many applicants at a given time; 
(2) the amount applied for was too high for the stated purpose; (3) there was a penalty because of late 
payments on the previous loan; (4) outstanding balance of the previous loan was automatically deducted 
(loan refinancing); and (5) other requirements set by the cooperative were not satisfied (e.g., delinquent 
depositor, lack of collateral, etc.). Nevertheless, all of them accepted the approved amount, but some 
of them supplemented it by borrowing from friends/relatives and moneylenders. 
Table 42 
LAST LOAN FROM THE CREDIT COOPERATIVE 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Year Obtained 
1981 - 1985 5 2.9 
1986 - 1989 161 92.0 
1990 9 s' 1 
Approved 
Disapproved 
C. Loan Amount (P) 
> 100,000 
Total 175 100.0 
B. Loan Status 
184 97.4 
5 2.6 
175 100.0 
14 7.7 < 1,000 
1,001 - 2,000 21 11.5 
2,001 - 3,000 11 6-° 
3,001 - 4,000 11 6.0 
4,001 - 5,000 11 6-° 
5,001 - 10,000 40 22.0 
10,001 - 20,000 33 18.1 
20,001 - 50,000 25 13.7 
50,001 - 100,000 15 8.2 1 0.5 
Total 182 100.0 
Mean = 17,743.54 
S.D. = 23,922.49 
D. Maturity (months) 
1 - 6 49 26.6 
7 - 12 57 31.0 
13 - 18 23 12.5 
19 - 24 30 16.3 
> 24 25 13.5 
Total 184 100.0 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
15.58 
10.28 
Table 47 (cont'd) 
No. of Observations Percent 
Amount of Installment Payments ( * ) 
< 250 41 27.7 
251 - 500 29 19.6 
501 - 750 14 9.5 
751 - 1,000 18 12.2 
1,001 - 5,000 42 28.4 
> 5,000 4 2.7 
Total 148 100.0 
Mean = 1,804.72 
S.D. 8,556.75 
Interest Rate on Loans (% p.a.) 
< 6.00 4 2.4 
> 6.00 - 12.00 83 50.0 
> 12.00 - 18.00 30 18.1 
> 18.00 - 24.00 47 28.3 
>24.00 2 1.2 
Total 166 100.0 
Mean = 15.06 
S.D. = 5.62 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 48 
NUMBER OF DAYS OF PROCESSING LOANS 
No. of Observations Percent 
< 1 5 2.9 
1 - 2 31 17.9 
3 - 4 18 10.4 
5 - 6 15 8.7 
7 - 8 36 20.8 
9 - 10 10 5.8 
> 10 58 33.5 
Total 173 100.0 
Mean - 9.99 
S.D. = 9.83 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 49 
PERSONAL VISITS IN FOLLOWING-UP LOAN APPLICATION 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Number of Personal Visits 
1 - 2 45 69.2 3 - 4 9 13.8 5 - 6 3 4.6 7 - 8 2 3.1 9 - 10 3 4.6 11 - 12 1 1.5 > 12 2 3.1 
Total 65 100.0 Mean = 2.97 
S.D. = 3.12 
B. Hours Per visit 
< 1.00 38 o3.3 
> 1 . 0 0 2.00 10 16.7 
> 2.00 3.00 5 8.3 
> 3.00 7 11.7 
Total 60 100.0 Mean = 1.73 
S.D. = 2.11 
C. Transportation Cost 
0 17 27.4 
1 - 2 22 35.5 3 - 4 12 19.4 5 - 6 4 6.4 7 - 8 2 3.2 > 8 5 8 
Total 62 100.0 Mean = 3.48 
S.D. = 5.21 
D. Other Out-Of-Pocket Expenses (?) 0 46 92.0 
1 1 2.0 3 1 2.0 10 2 4.0 
Total 50 100.0 Mean = 0 .48 
S.D. = 2.01 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Table 50 shows the main purposes of the most recent loans obtained by the respondents. It can 
be observed that the loans were intended mainly to finance businesses, household repairs and 
improvements, and family consumption, in that order. 
As of the period of survey, 53.4 percent of the respondents had paid back their loan or at least 
made the payments already due, while 33.7 percent were still waiting for the due date. The average 
amount of payment made was P9,274. Those who have not made any payment for the loans already due 
cited insufficient income and emergency expenses as reasons. Thus, in order,to collect payments, the 
credit cooperatives have taken two common steps: (1) sending a collection letter to the borrower; and 
(2) making a collection visit by one of the cooperative staff or officers.. The cooperatives also exerted 
some forms of pressure, which included cancellation or suspension of membership, imposition of a 
moratorium on new loans until the outstanding balance has been fully paid, and curtailment of 
borrower's access to the cooperative's services. 
Cases of loan disapproval are very minimal. This only takes place when a borrower is not yet 
qualified for loan restructuring/refinancing. 
Out of 200 respondents, only 59 percent regularly attend the general assembly. However, 61 
percent attended the last general assembly. Most of those who did not attend the last general meeting/ 
assembly were too busy with their work; a number of them were also out of town. Another reason for 
non-attendance was the lack of information. Some respondents were not informed about the date and 
time of the last general assembly. 
Thirty-four percent of the respondents claimed that other members of the household were also 
members of a credit cooperative. On the average, 1.6 of other household members are also cooperative 
members. Table 51 shows these other members' outstanding fixed and savings deposits, and the amount 
of the last loan they obtained from the credit cooperative. It can be observed that these other household 
members are active cooperative members, as seen in their substantial fixed and savings deposits. Some 
of them have larger loans outstanding than the respondents themselves. 
C. Membership in a Paluwagan 
Only 22 of the respondents are members of a paluwagan, an informal savings association. These 
respondents may have joined a paliiwagan to diversify their savings into other associations where 
obtaining funds in times of emergency is relatively easy. Since a paluwagan normally has a smaller 
membership, saving and borrowing may not be very complicated and tedious as in credit cooperatives 
and banks. Further, some respondents may have joined a paluwagan to show camaraderie to organizers 
who may be close friends or relatives. Membership in a paluwagan is normally obtained through 
invitations from the organizers themselves. However, not all of the 22 respondents belonged to a 
paluwagan unit which functioned permanently during the year. Two respondents were members of a 
paluwagan that operated occasionally in a year. 
Sizes of the paluwagan varied from six to 150 members, although the majority of respondents 
belonged to a paluwagan which had less than 30 members. On the average, there were 34.8 members 
in a paluwagan (Table 52). 
Table 42 
PURPOSE OF LAST LOAN 
No. of Observations Percent 
Business 97 54.5 
Household Appliances/Furniture and Fixtures 3 1.7 
Household Repairs/Improvement 25 14.0 
Family Consumption 13 7.3 
Restructuring of Old Loans from the Cooperative 1 0.6 
Lending to others 2 1.1 
Education 9 5.1 
Medical Care 6 3.4 
House/Lot Acquisition 5 2.8 
Jewelries 1 0.6 
Repair of Vehicles 5 2.8 
Animal Feeds 3 1.7 
Travel Purposes 2 1.1 
Purchase of Vehicles 2 1-1 Others 4 2.4 
Total 178 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Table 56 
OTHER CREDIT COOPERATIVE MEMBERS WITHIN THE FAMILY 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Number 
1 45 66.2 
2 15 22.1 
3 3 4.4 
4 3 4.4 
5 1 1.5 
6 1 1.5 
Total 68 100.0 
Mean = 1.57 
S.D. = 1.04 
B. Average Outstanding Fixed Deposit (?) 
Member l 5,261.00 
Member 2 7,905.00 
Member 3 7,350.00 
Member 4 1,985.00 
Member 5 1,725.00 
Member 6 1,700.00 
c. Average Outstanding Savings Deposits 
Minimum Maximum 
Member 1 2,917 
Member 2 2,210 
Member 3 5,768 
Member 4 100 
Member 5 -
Member 6 - -
D. Average Amount of Last Loan from Credit Cooperative (?) 
Member l 15,710 
Member 2 28,121 
Member 3 35,050 
Member 4 
Member 5 
Member 6 
E. Average Outstanding Loan (as of period of survey, P) 
Member 1 10,830 
Member 2 15,012 
Member 3 40,000 
Member 4 60,000 
Member 5 -
Member 6 -
Source: Crjedit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989, 
Table 66 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE PALUWAGAN 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Number of Members 
6 -
11 -
21 -
31 -
41 -
> 50 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
4 
3 
7 
2 
2 
3 
Total 
Mean = 34.81 
S.D. = 32.00 
21 
B. Frequency of Contribution 
Weekly 
Twice/Month 
Monthly 
7 
7 
6 
Total 20 
C. Amount of Regular Contribution (P) 
< 50 
50 
101 
151 
> 200 
- 100 
- 150 
- 200 
2 
11 
1 
2 
5 
Total 20 
Mean = 216.90 
S.D. = 277.19 
D. Turn of Receiving "Sahod" 
By lottery 15 
By paluwagan manager 3 
By voting 1 
First come/first serve 2 
Total 2 1 
19.0 
14.3 
33 
9 
9, 
14, 
100.0 
35.0 
35.0 
30.0 
100.0 
9, 
52. 
4. 
9. 
23.8 
100.0 
71.4 
14.3 
4.8 
9.5 
100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Seven of the 22 respondents made their regular contribution on a weekly basis, while another 
seven respondents on a bi-monthly basis. The rest belonged to a paluwagan that required a monthly 
contribution. The average regular contribution was P217. The term for receiving the kitty, 01 "sahod," 
was determined most of the time by lottery, though some respondents also claimed that it was determined 
by the paluwagan manager. However, the terms for receiving the "sahod" could not be changed except 
in emergency cases. 
Aside from the paluwagan, very few of the respondents know of other informal savings 
associations operating in their areas. Only two of them have deposits in these other savings associations. 
The deposits are very minimal compared to their deposits in the credit cooperatives. The average 
minimum and maximum deposits are only P87.50 and P275, respectively. 
D. Saving and Borrowing from the Bank 
Eighty-three (39.2%) respondents have savings deposits in banks, mostly in commercial and 
private development banks. Less than 50 percent of them, however, can be considered active depositors 
who have frequent deposit transactions (i.e., monthly, bi-monthly, etc.) for the past 12 months prior to 
the survey. Table 53 shows the amount of savings deposit they have made and the outstanding balance 
as of the period of survey. It appears that these respondents have larger savings deposit balances in banks 
than in the credit cooperative. Some members still placed a larger portion of their savings in banks. 
The banks happened to be relatively accessible to the respondents,79 percent of whom have to 
travel only five kilometers or less to reach the bank from their houses. On the average, the distance from 
residence to bank is 5.4 kilometers. Most of the respondents spent an average of 27 minutes to commute, 
and an average of 46 minutes to complete the deposit transaction. (These figures are close to the amount 
of time spent by other respondents in travelling to and completing a deposit transaction in the credit 
cooperative.) Transportation and out-of-pocket expenses incurred averaged P4.58 and P5.52, respec-
tively (Table 54). The majority of the respondents seldom withdraw from their bank savings account, 
at most only two or three times during the past 12 months. This suggests that savings deposits are a long-
term investment for most of them. Only nine (4.6%) respondents have time deposit accounts in banks. 
On the average, the amount of time deposit is P17,500, with an interest rate of 11.8 percent per annum. 
The average maturity period is 207 days. 
Only 20 (5.3%) of the respondents borrowed from the banks in the last two years. The loans were 
obtained between 1988 and 1990, mostly from rural banks. The amount ranged from P3,000 to 
P220,000, with an average of P49,600. The loans had an average maturity 45.2 months, payable on an 
average of 43 installments. Thus, these were basically long-term loans intended for business financing. 
With an average interest rate of 19.4 percent per annum, most interest payments were discounted in 
advance. Collateral, like house and lot, land, house, and fishing boat, was required for some of these 
loans. The average value of the collateral was P149,286. 
Only two out of 10 borrowers received technical assistance from the bank. The borrowers were 
visited twice on the average by extension agents from the bank during the processing of their loan 
applications. 
Table £3 
SAVINGS DEPOSITS IN BANKS 
No. of Observations Percent 
Minimum Savings Deposit Made - Past 12 mos. (P) 
< 500 34 51.5 501 - 1, 000 12 18.2 
1,001 - 2,000 2 3.0 
2,001 - 3 , 000 2 3.0 
3,001 - 4, 000 3 4.5 
4,001 - 5, 000 4 6.1 5,001 - 10,000 5 7 . 6 
> 10,000 4 6.1 
Total 66 100. 0 
Mean = 2,497.57 
S. D_. = 4,027.94 
Maximum Savings Deposit Made - Past 12 mos. (?) 
< 5,000 36 66.7 
5,001 - 10,000 6 11.1 10,001 - 15,000 1 1.9 
15,001 - 20,000 4 7 . 4 
25,001 - 30,000 . 2 3 . 7 30,001 - 35,000 1 1.9 35,001 - 40,000 1 1.9 45,001 - 50,000 1 1.9 > 50,000 2 3.7 
Total 54 100. 0 
Mean = 18,134.61 
S.D. = 59,581.05 
Minimum Outstanding Savings i Deposit - Past 12 mos 
< 5,000 39 79.6 
5,001 - 10,000 5 10.2 10,001 - 15,000 1 2 . 0 15,001 - 20,000 2 4.1 25,001 - 30,000 1 2 . 0 > 50,000 1 2.0 
Total 
Mean = 
S.D. = 5,576.53 14,885.22 
49 100. 0 
Table 53 (cont'd) 
No. of Observations Percent 
D. Maximum Outstanding Savings Deposit - Past 12 mos. (P) 
< 5,000 23 48.9 5,001 - 10,000 10 21.3 
10,001 - 15,000 3 6.4 
15,001 - 20,000 3 6.4 
20,001 - 25,000 2 4.3 
25,001 - 30,000 2 4.3 
45,001 - 50,000 1 2.1 
> 50,000 3 6.4 
Total 47 100.0 
Mean = 22,612.77 
S.D. = 64,085.46 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members'Survey, 1989. 
Table 54 
TIME AND COST IN DEPOSITING IN THE BANK 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. 
C. 
Travel Time (minutes) 
< 10 > 10 - 20 > 20 - 30 > 30 - 40 > 40 - 50 > 50 - 60 > 60 
Total Mean = 27.04 S.D. = 35.50 
Waiting Time in Bank \K. 
< 10 > 10 - 20 > 20 — 30 > 30 - 40 > 50 - 60 > 60 
Total Mean = 45.65 S.D. = 62.26 
Transportation Cost Per 
0 > 0 - 2 > 2 — 4 > 4 — 6 > 6 - 8 > 8 - 10 > 1 0 
23 19 12 2 
1 
6 3 
~34.8 
28.8 
18.2 3.0 1.5 9.1 4.5 
66 100.0 
14 9 22 
2 9 7 
63 
22.2 14.3 34.9 3.2 14.3 11.1 
100.0 
Total Mean = 4.58 S.D. = 5,89 
8 12.1 29 43.9 13 19.7 5 7.6 3 4.5 1 1.5 7 10.6 
66 100.0 
D. Other Out-of-Pocket Expenses (?) 
> 
> 
> 
> 
0 
0 5 15 
20 
5 10 20 
Total Mean = 5.52 S.D. = 17.45 
38 79.2 1 2.1 5 10.4 1 2.1 3 6.3 
48 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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On the average, the banks which granted the loans were located 12.5 kilometers from the 
respondents' homes. In going to the bank, the respondents travelled by bus/jeepney on an average of 
53.4 minutes per round trip. Other out-of-pocket expenses were nil, but transportation cost, on the 
average, was P5.50 per round trip. Most of the respondents visited the bank twice to obtain the loans. 
Each visit consumed at least one-half day of the borrower's time. 
Processing took an average of 10.8 days from submission of loan application to disbursement of 
loan. Almost all of the borrowers received the entire amount requested in their loan applications. As 
of the period of survey, six borrowers had fully paid their loans, or at least made the payments due. The 
others were still waiting for the first due date of payment. 
E. Informal Credit 
1. Friends/Relatives 
Aside from credit cooperatives and banks, some respondents obtained credit from other sources. 
Specifically, 71 (33.3%) respondents borrowed from friends/relatives on the average of 3.7 times during 
the past 12 months prior to the survey. The average amount of loan obtained was P 12,663, which is quite 
substantial compared with the average loan amount obtained from the credit cooperative. Many of these 
loans were short-term in nature, some with maturities of 30 days or less, but the average maturity was 
85 days (Table 55). Since some loans were obtained from relatives, repayment term was normally on 
a "pay when able" basis. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents have to'pay back these loans. As of 
the survey period, 49 percent of them have already fully paid their loans, though there still remains an 
average outstanding balance of P9,346. The average number of installment payments was 3.32, with 
most of the loans payable in lump siim or up to two installments. Only 28 percent of those who borrowed 
from friends/relatives were charged interest rates. The charges, however, were not uniform as lenders 
imposed interest rates on a daily, weekly, and monthly bases. The average peso amounts of the charges 
were P12.50 for the daily, P392 for the weekly, and P300 for the monthly. 
In terms of interest rates, the average charge was 196.6 percent per annum. Almost all loans were 
paid in cash, which averaged P15,354 including principal and interest (Table 56). It appears, though, 
that these lenders did not require their borrowers to present collaterals. Only three borrowers had to 
secure loans with a collateral, while four were given a condition prior to the release of loans. This was 
to remind them of the deadline for loan repayments. 
Table 57 shows the intended uses of the loans obtained from friends/relatives. It can be observed 
that several of these loans were used to finance acquisition of household appliances, family consump-
tion, and business ventures, in that order. 
1. Moneylenders 
Twenty five (12.3%) of the respondents obtained loans from moneylenders on the average of 1.9 
times during the past 12 months. The average amount of loan was P4,664, with an average maturity 
period of 101 days (Table 58). Loan repayment was spread out on the average of 8.5 instalments. As 
of the survey period, the average outstanding loan balance was P3,187. 
Table 55 
LAST LOAN FROM FRIENDS/ RELATIVES 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Amount (?) 
< 1,000 
1,001 - 2,000 
2,001 - 3,000 
3,001 - 4,000 
4,001 - 5,000 
5,001 - 10,000 
> 10,000 
Total 
Mean = 12,662.85 
S.D. = 50,994.53 
Days of Maturity 
1 - 30 
31 - 60 
61 - 90 
> 90 
Total 
Mean = 84.65 
S.D. = 91.96 
Loan Outstanding Balance ( 
0 
> 0 1,000 
> 1000 - 2,000 
> 2000 - 3,000 
> 3000 - 4,000 
> 4000 - 5,000 
> 5000 
Total 
Mean = 9,346.45 
S.D. = 54,918.80 
No. of Installment Payment 
1 - 2 
3 - 4 
> 5 
Total 
Mean = 3.32 
S.D. = 6.18 
27 
1 
9 
2 
7 
5 
11 
62 
43.5 
1.6 
14.5 
3.2 
11.3 
8.1 
17-7 
100.0 
19 
7 
2 
15 
43 
44.2 
16.3 
4.7 
34.9 
100.0 
26 
12 
3 
4 
• 1 
3 
4 
53 
49.1 
22.6 
5.7 
7.5 
1.9 
5.7 
7*5 
100.0 
30 
7 
7 
44 
68.2 
15.9 
15.9 
100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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Table 56 
AMOUNT OF CASH PAID BACK TO FRIENDS/ RELATIVES 
(Principal and Interest, P) 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Amount (P) 
< 1,000 20 47.6 
1,001 - 2,000 6 14.3 
2,001 - 3,000 2 4.8 
3,001 - 4,000 2 4.8 
4,001 - 5,000 3 7.1 
5,001 - 10,000 2 4.8 
Above 10,000 7 16.7 
Total 42 100.0 
Mean = 15,354.38 
S.D. = 61,856.89 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 57 
PURPOSE OF THE LOAM OBTAINED 
FROM FRIENDS/RELATIVES 
No. of Observations Percent 
Business 11 
Household Appliances, Furniture and Fixtures 16 
Household Repairs/Improvement 6 
Family Consumption 15 
Loan Payments 2 
Education 5 
Medical Care 3 
House/Lot Acquisition 1 
Repair of Vehicles 2 
Animal Feeds and Farming Purposes 2 
Emergency 3 
Others 1 
16.4 
23.9 
9.0 
22.4 
3.0 
7.5 
4.5 
1.5 
3.0 
3.0 
4.5 
1.5 
Total 67 100.0 
Source: Crjedit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989, 
Table 49 
LOANS OBTAINED FROM MONEYLENDERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
C. 
D. 
Amount (?) 
< 1,000 9 40.9 
1,001 - 2,000 7 31.8 
2,001 - 3,000 1 4.5 
3,001 - 4,000 1 4.5 
4,001 - 5,000 2 9.1 
> 10,000 2 9.1 
Total 22 100.0 
Mean = 4,663.64 
S.D. = 10,588.11 
Maturity Period (days) 
1 - 30 7 35.0 
31 - 60 3 15.0 
61 - 90 2 10.0 
> 90 8 40.0 
Total 20 100.0 
Mean = 100.87 
S.D. = 85.27 
No. of Installment Payment 
1 - 2 3 17.6 
3 - 4 4 23.5 
> 5 10 58.8 
Total 17 100.0 
Mean = 8.47 
S.D. = 10.09 
Loan Outstanding Balance (as of survey period, [?]) 
0 9 42.9 > 0 - 1,000 6 28.6 > 1,000 - 2,000 4 19.0 > 5,000 2 9.5 
Total 21 100.0 Mean = 3,186.67 
S.D. = 10,801.52 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
94 
All loans were charged interest rates on a weekly, monthly, and annual bases. On the average, 
the interest rate was 177 percent per annum. The average peso amount of the charges was P1,192, which 
is roughly 28 percent of the average loan amount. All loans were paid in cash, which averaged P5,853 
for both principal and interest (Table 59). Five of the respondents secured their loans with a pledge or 
collateral, and four were given conditions. 
As shown in Table 60, several of the loans were used to finance business ventures, family 
consumption, medical care, and house repairs/improvements, in that order. 
Negotiations for loans usually took place at the moneylender's residence which, on the average, 
was 2.2 kilometers from the respondent's house. On the average, the respondents met the moneylenders 
1.3 times in obtaining the loan, with each meeting lasting 35 minutes, in addition to 22 minutes in travel 
time per round trip. Average transportation and other out-of-pocket expenses incurred were equivalent 
to PI.87 and P1.28, respectively (Table 61). 
Processing of loan requests did not usually take long. Most of the respondents obtained their 
loans on the same day they made the requests. It only took an average of 1.7 days from request to 
disbursement of loans ( Table 62). Further, almost all respondents received the loan in just one 
disbursement and on time at the moneylender's residence. 
Twelve (54.5%) had fully paid, or at least made the payments due, while the rest are still waiting 
for the due dates. The respondents had to pay their loans at the moneylender's house. 
3. Traders 
Nineteen respondents (9.8%) borrowed from traders on the average of 15.7 times during the past 
12 months. The loan amount averaged P54,489, payable in 3.2 average installments within a period 
of 61.4 days. As of the survey period, the average loan balance was P53,508 (Table 63). 
Only four of the respondents were charged interest on loans on an annual basis, with an average 
rate of 11.7 percent. This is relatively lower than the average rate charged by the credit cooperative. 
Almost all the loans were paid back, or required to be paid, in cash. As of the survey period, the amount 
of cash payment for both principal and interest averaged P36,039 (Table 64). Only one respondent 
was required to secure the loan with collateral in the form of chattel. The rest obtained the loans without 
any collateral requirement. Most of the loans were used for business purposes (Table 65). 
The respondents negotiated for the loans at the trader's residence which, on the average, was 
eight kilometers from their homes. The number of meetings that took place averaged 1.3, with each 
meeting lasting approximately 30.6 minutes. Average transportation and other out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred were P13.20 and P0.55, respectively (Table 66). 
Loans from traders are not usually obtained on the same day of request. It took an average of 
3.5 days from loan request to loan disbursement (Table 67). However, at disbursement, the respondents 
obtained the entire amount of the loan. In most cases, they received the loans at the traders's residence. 
95 
Table 59 
AMOUNT OF CASH PAID BACK TO MONEYLENDERS 
(Principal and Interest, in P) 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Amount (in P) 
^ 1,000 
1,001 - 2,000 
2,001 - 3,000 
5,001 - 10,000 
> 10,000 
Total 
6 
4 
4 
1 
2 
17 
35.3 
23.5 
23.5 
5.9 
11.8 
100.0 
Mean = 5,853.23 
S.D. = 13,264.83 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 60 
PURPOSE OF THE LOAN OBTAINED FROM MONEYLENDERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
Business 5 23.8 Household Appliances, Furniture and Fixtures 1 4.8 Household Repairs/Improvement 3 14.3 Family Consumption 5 23.8 Loan Payments 1 4.8 Education 1 4.8 Medical Care 4 19.0 Others 1 4.8 
Total 21 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 61 
TIME AND COST SPENT IN OBTAINING LOAN FROM MONEYLENDERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Travel Time Per Roundtrip (hrs.) 
Less than 1 hour 16 
One hour 3 
Total 
Mean = 0.36 
S.D. = 0.35 
19 
84.2 
15.8 
100.0 
B. Transportation Cost (in P) 
0 
2 
6 
Total 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
1.87 
1.92 
5 
8 
2 
15 
33.3 
53.3 
13.3 
100.0 
C. Other Out-of-Pocket Expenses (in P) 
0 12 
8 1 
10 1 
Total 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
14 
1.28 
3.29 
D. Number of Meetings with Moneylenders 
1 
2 
4 
Total 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
1.27 
0.70 
18 
3 
1 
22 
85.7 
7.1 
7.1 
100.0 
81.8 
13.6 
4.5 
100.0 
E. Hours Per Meeting 
Less than 1 hour 
One hour 
Two hours 
Total 
Mean = 0.58 
S.D. 0.53 
12 
8 
1 
21 
57.1 
38.1 
4.8 
100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 42 
NUMBER OF DAYS OF PROCESSING LOANS FROM MONEYLENDERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
1 14 66.7 
2 4 19.0 
3 2 9.5 
7 1 4.8 
Total 21 100.0 
Mean = 1.67 
S.D. = 1.39 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 63 
LAST LOAN FROM TRADERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. 
B. 
D. 
Amount (in P) 
< 1,000 5 26.3 1,001 - 2,000 2 10.5 
2,001 - 3,000 2 10.5 
4,001 - 5,000 1 5.3 
5,001 - 10,000 2 10.5 
> 10,000 7 36.8 
Total 19 100.0 
Mean = 54,489.47 
S.D. = 125,074.94 
Days of Maturity 
1 - 3 0 11 64.7 
31 - 60 1 5.9 
61 - 90 1 5.9 
> 90 4 23.5 
Total 17 100.0 
Mean = 61.35 
S.D. = 79.35 
No. of Installment Payment. 
1 - 2 14 82.4 
3 - 4 1 5.9 
> 5 2 11.8 
Total 17 100.0 
Mean = 3.18 
S.D. = 7.01 
Loan Outstanding Balance (as of survey period, in P) 
0 5 27.8 
> 0 1,000 5 27.8 
> 1000 - 2,000 2 11.1 
> 2000 - 3,000 1 5.6 
> 5000 - 5 27.8 
Total 18 100.0 
Mean = 53,508.33 
S.D. = 129,502.63 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 64 
AMOUNT OF CASH PAID BACK TO TRADERS 
(Principal and Interest, in P) 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Amount (in P) 
0 
> 0 - 1,000 
> 1,001 - 2,000 
> 10,000 
1 
5 
2 
6 
7.1 
35.7 
14.3 
42.9 
Total 14 1 0 0 . 0 
Mean = 36,039.28 
S.D. = 73,156.19 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 65 
PURPOSE OF THE LOAN OBTAINED FROM TRADERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
Business 
Household Appliances, 
9 69.2 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Family Consumption 
1 
3 
7.7 
23.1 
Total 13 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 66 
TIME AND COST SPENT IN OBTAINING LOANS FROM TRADERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
A. Travel Time Per Roundtrip (hrs.) 
Less than 1 hour 10 66.7 
One hour 2 13.3 
Two hours 3 0.2 
Total 15 100.0 
Mean = 0.72 
S.D. = 0.73 
B. Transportation Cost Per Roundtrip (in P) 1 - 2 2 20.0 
2 - 4 1 1 0 . 0 
5 - 6 1 1 0 . 0 
> 6 4 40.0 
Total 15 100.0 
Mean = 1 3 . 2 0 
S.D. = 16.00 
C. Other Out-of-Pocket Expenses (in P) 
0 8 88.9 
5 1 H . l 
Total 9 100.0 
Mean = 0.55 
S.D. = 1.67 
D. Number of Meetings with Traders 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
Mean = 1.29 
S.D. = 0.69 
E. Hours Per Meeting 
Less than 1 hour 
One hour 
Total 
Mean = 0.51 
S.D. = 0.40 
14 82.4 
1 5.9 
2 11.8 
18 100.0 
11 64.7 
6 35.3 
17 100.0 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
Table 66 
NUMBER OF DAYS OF PROCESSING LOANS FROM TRADERS 
No. of Observations Percent 
< 1 
1 
5 
14 
30 
Total 18 
5.6 
77.8 
5.6 
5.6 
5.6 
100.0 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
3.53 
7.32 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989 
Table 68 
TOTAL AMOUNT OF LOANS/ASSISTANCE 
EXTENDED BY CREDIT COOPERATIVE MEMBERS 
(in 
No. of Observations Percent 
£ 
1,001 
2,001 -
3,001 -
4,001 -
5,001 -
> 10,000 
Total 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 10,000 
23 
7 
9 
3 
2 
6 
14 
64 
35.9 
10.9 
l * . l 
4.7 
3.1 
9.4 
21.9 
100.0 
Mean = 
S.D. = 
14,397.50 
40,237.97 
Source: Credit Cooperative Members Survey, 1989. 
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F. Lending Activities 
Several credit cooperative members are engaged in some lending activities. Sixty-seven 
(32.5%) respondents have extended loans or assistance to 23 borrowers for the past 12 months. Most 
of the loans extended were in the form of cash, with an average amount of P14,397 (Table 68). However, 
only 10 of them charged interest rates on these loans, whose average maturity was 240 days. 
G. Summary 
It is evident that credit cooperative members resort to alternative sources of credit and outlets for 
their surplus resources. This is not unusual since an individual seeks to maximize the benefits obtained 
from saving and borrowing in a particular institution, and credit cooperative members are no exception. 
In addition, there may be factors that could have discouraged cooperative members from putting all their 
surplus resources in the cooperative and depending solely on it for credit. 
On the saving aspect, there are credit cooperative members with substantial amount of surplus 
resources who are capable of maintaining several savings deposit accounts in different institutions. 
These members may seek to diversify their savings portfolio in such a way that they can avail of the 
services provided by different institutions aside from maximizing the returns on these alternative saving 
instruments. For instance, most of the credit cooperatives in this study provide higher interest rates on 
savings deposit than banks. The fact that credit cooperatives do not impose a withholding tax on interest 
income on deposits effectively increases the returns on savings deposits. 
However, in terms of additional services like telegraphic transfer, checking account, etc., 
cooperative members can attain them if they have deposits in banks. As regard borrowing, there is no 
doubt that credit cooperatives do not impose stringent landing policies (i.e., collateral requirement, 
project feasibility study, equity counterpart for business projects, etc.) to prove the borrower's credit 
worthiness, and they provide flexible terms and conditions on loan repayments. But the loan ceiling 
policy may have discouraged members from placing their entire savings in the credit cooperative. It is 
important to note that there are affluent members in these credit cooperatives who would qualify to 
obtain bigger amounts of loans in banks than in the cooperatives! 
The above arguments do not imply that the credit cooperatives will eventually lose their grip on 
their members. But there is a need for them to provide more efficient services to members in terms of 
processing deposits and withdrawals, and facilitating the processing and disbursement of loans in shorter 
periods. 
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VI. DEMAND FOR FIXED DEPOSIT AND OTHER ISSUES 
A. Demand for Share Capital 
In this section, the demand for credit cooperative share capital or fixed deposits is estimated 
using the standard model of the demand for financial assets. It is important to point out, however, that 
some modifications were made in the model to capture the unique characteristics of the demand for fixed 
deposits. Thus, additional variables that could help explain holdings of fixed deposits have been 
included. Three sets of regression runs were conducted. Table 69 shows the description of the variables 
included in the estimation. 
Several hypotheses are tested in the model. These are as follows: 
First, the interest rate on fixed deposits, variable i, is expected to have a positive sign, indicating 
that credit cooperative members tend to increase their fixed deposits if offered higher interest rates on 
share capital. 
Second, the income variable, Y, will have a positive effect on the demand for fixed deposits. In 
other words, an increase in the income of individual members increases their demand for share capital. 
However, an alternative hypothesis—that an increase in the member's income reduces fixed deposit 
holdings—is also tested. This test considers that this type of financial asset is inferior due to the belief 
that those who join the credit cooperatives belong to low-income groups who do not have access to the 
financial services of formal financial institutions. 
Third, the amount of loans, L, that members obtain from the credit cooperative usually depends 
on their fixed deposits. Thus, those who want to increase their loanable amount would likely increase 
their share capital. 
Fourth, the length of membership, M, in the credit cooperative, which is also expected to have 
a positive sign, serves as a proxy variable for the degree of members' confidence in their cooperatives. 
Thus, the longer the period of membership, or similarly the higher the degree of confidence in the credit 
cooperative, the greater is the member's demand for fixed deposits. 
Fifth, members with higher dependency ratio, D, in their households tend to have lower savings 
rate. Thus, the dependency ratio variable exerts a negative eff ect on the demand for fixed deposits. This 
variable is defined as the ratio of the total number of unemployed household members to total household 
size. Lamberte and Bautista (1990) used the same variable in estimating a household saving function, 
and the expected negative sign was obtained in all the regression runs. 
Finally, two dummy variables were included in the model to explain the effects of occupational 
status (i.e., stable source of income), represented by dummy variable 1 (DUM1), and saving in banks, 
represented by dummy variable 2 (DUM2), on credit cooperative members' demand for fixed deposits. 
DUM1 is expected to yield a positive sign showing that members with stable sources of income are more 
likely to save in credit cooperatives. On the other hand, DUM2 is expected to have a negative sign 
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Table 69 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
Variable First Set Second Set Third Set 
Dependent: 
Fixed Deposit 
Independent: 
C Intercept - do - •do* 
1 Current Interest Rate on Fixed Deposit 
- do • -do* 
Y Annual Income of Members - do -
H Total Household Income • 
L Amount of the most recent 
loan from the CCU 
-do- -do* 
M Number of Years of Membership 
in the CCU 
- do - - do -
D Dependency Ratio -do- * do -
S - • Total Household Savings 
DUM1 Dummy Variable 1 
1 - salaried worker 
0 = otherwise 
-do* -do-
DUM2 Dummy Variable 2 
1 - with bank deposits 
0 - otherwise 
•do-
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showing that members who do not-have access to banks arc more likely to save in credit cooperatives. 
The above comprises the first set of regression runs.22 
The second set of regression runs replaces the individual member's income with the total 
household income, H (which is also expected to have a positive sign), as one of the explanatory variables. 
The rest of the variables presented in the first set are included. 
In the third set of regression runs, total household saving, S, replaces the second dummy 
variable, while the rest of the variables in the first set are included. It is hypothesized that household 
saving will positively affect the demand for fixed deposits. 
The empirical model was tested in different functional forms using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method. The linear functional form yielded relatively better results than the logarithmic form. 
The results of both functional forms are presented in Tables 70-75. All the regression results show that 
the independent variables explain 60 to 70 percent of the variation in the demand for fixed deposits. 
Likewise, the regression models are all plausible as shown by their statistically significant F-statistics. 
Tables 70 and 71 show the results of the first set of regression runs in linear and logarithmic 
forms, respectively. The interest rate variable has the expected positive sign in all models, especially 
in the linear form. This is highly significant because it supports the hypothesis posed earlier, that credit 
cooperative members tend to increase their fixed deposits if offered higher interest rates on share capital. 
Furthermore, the results in the logarithmic form show that the demand for fixed deposits is interest 
elastic, as shown by the estimated coefficients of the interestrate variable, which is greater than one. This 
implies that the demand for fixed deposits is highly responsive to the interest rate paid on fixed deposits, 
or to the dividends on share capital. Interestingly, similar results for the interestrate variable were also 
obtained in the second and third sets of regression runs (Tables 72-75). 
The OSU-PIDS study on credit cooperatives, however, yielded a different result; here the 
demand for fixed deposits is inelastic with respect to the interestrate.23 In the Comparative Bank Study, 
the demand for deposit instruments was estimated.24 The results showed that the demand for bank 
deposits was inelastic with respect to the interest rate. This suggests that interest rate does not mean 
anything to people if financial institutions are not accessible to them. The interest rate variable used in 
that study was the effective interest rate on deposits. Moreover, the banks included in the study were 
located outside Metro Manila. 
The individual members' income variable, on the other hand, yielded the expected positive sign 
but was not statistically significant in some of the regression runs as shown in Table 70. In the 
logarithmic form, the sign was negative, though not statistically Significant ( Table 71). The same 
negative sign for the individual members' income variable was also obtained in the third set of regression 
22. Additional dummy variables for household position, sex and the type of credit cooperative were included in some of 
the regression runs. However, they were found to be sttistically insignificant in explaining the demand for fixed deposits by 
members, 
23. See lamberte, Relampagos and Graham (1990). 
24. See Lamberie (1987). 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C -10860.6 -10206.2 -11280.3 -13009.5 
(-2.000)" (-2.100)** (-2.095)** (-2.649)*** 
i 959.41 952.436 976.145 1053.453 
(2.547)*" (2.548)"* (2.604)*" (2.906)*" 
Y 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.030 
(1.606) (1.663)* (1.511) (2.009)** 
L 0.279 0.279 0.278 0.280 
(10.231)"* (10.314)"* (10.234)*" (10.253)"* 
M 285.58 287.263 273.424 280.981 
(2.200)** (2.227)** (2.130)" (2.168)" 
D 950.558 1141.766 1170.09 
(0.276) - (0.334) (0.341) 
DUM1 -1363.7 -1391.51 -1382.24 
(-0.930) (-0.957) (-0.946) -
DUM2 -1018.4 -1047.94 -1041.01 
(-0.728) (-0.755) - (-0.745) 
DF 91 91 91 91 
2 
R 0.672 0.675 0.674 0.672 
F-Stat 27.615*** 32.559*** 32;308*" 32.124"* 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
" - significant at 5 percent 
*** - significant at 1 percent 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C -1.200 
(-0.704) 
•1.221 
(-0.724) 
-1.150 
(-0.680) 
-1.166 
(-0.698) 
-2.199 
(-1.373) 
i 1.020 
(1.877)* 
1.024 
(1.899)* 
1.043 
(1.941)* 
1.045 
(1.959)** 
1.241 
(2.344)" 
Y -0.008 
(-0.075) 
-0.010 
(-0.104) 
-0.016 
(-0.158) 
-0.017 
(-0.180) 
0.015 
(0.155) 
L 0.663 
(8.751)*** 
0.663 
(8.802)*** 
0.659 
(8.817)*** 
0.659 
(8.871)*** 
0.666 
(8.754)*** 
M 0.566 
(2.450)** 
0.566 
(2.463)** 
0.557 
(2.436)** 
0.557 
(2.450)" 
0.566 
(2.439)** 
D -0.078 
(-0.119) -
-0.054 
(-0.083) 
-
-
DUM1 -0.293 
(-1.690)* 
-0.292 
(-1.696)* 
-0.294 
(-1.702)* 
-0.293 
(-1.711)* -
DUM2 -0.068 
(-0.379) 
-0.066 
(-0.372) 
- - -0.071 
(-0.396) 
DF 91 91 91 91 91 
2 
R 0.651 0.655 0.654 0.658 0.647 
F-Stat 25.191"* 29.732*** 29.665*** 36.012*** 34.354*** 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
** - significant at 5 percent 
* " - significant at 1 percent 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C 11394 
(-2.281)** 
-12777.8 
(-3.049)*** 
-11345.9 
(-2.293)** 
-14566.9 
(-3.767)*** 
i 1210.70 
(3.666)"* 
1225.644 
(3.740)*** 
1217.131 
(3.712)*** 
1319.407 
(4.164)*** 
H -0.004 
(-1.529) 
-0.004 
(-1.517) 
-0.004 
(-1.529) 
-0.003 
(-1.333) 
L 0.275 
(11.794)*** 
0.274 
(11.836)*** 
0.276 
(11.987)*** 
0.275 
(11.888)*** 
M 311.499 
(2.562)*** 
298.552 
(2.516)** 
318.602 
(2.681)*** 
295.90 
(2.491)*** 
D -1718.14 
(-0.538) -
-1757.53 
(-0.554) -
DUM1 -1525.02 
(-1.220) 
-1250.85 
(-1.101) 
-1527.11 
(-1.229) - ' 
DUM2 379.920 
(0.316) 
405.183 
(0.339) 
- 389.851 
(0.326) 
DF 91 91 91 91 
2 
R 0.681 0.683 0.684 0.683 
F-Stat 28.713*** 33.732*** 33.840** 40.137*** 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
** - significant at 5 percent 
*** - significant at 1 percent 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C -1.414 
(-0.792) 
-2.023 
(-1.169) 
-1.550 
(-0.890) 
-2.955 
(-1.778)* 
i 1.292 
(2.424)** 
1.355 
(2.541)*** 
1.230 
(2.450)** 
1.600 
(3.057)*** 
H 0.083 
(0.994) 
0.093 
(1.101) 
0.088 
(1.057) 
0.124 
(1 -482) 
L 0.583 
(7.925)*** 
0.579 
(7.842)*** 
0.589 
(8.133)*** 
0.574 
(7.665)*** 
M 0.418 
(1.756)* 
0.366 
(1.551) 
0.442 
(1.898)* 
0.390 
(1.607) 
D -0.896 
(-1.308) -
-0.900 
(-1.320) 
-0.312 
(-0.488) 
DUM1 -0.375 
(-2.119)** 
-0.282 
(-1.733)* 
-0.372 
(-2.113)** -
DUM2 0.088 
(0.502) 
0.090 
(0.514) 
- 0.076 
(0.425) 
DF 91 91 91 91 
2 
R 0.647 0.644 0.650 0.632 
F-Stat 24.826*** 28.440*** 29.179*** 27.102*** 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
** - significant at 5 percent 
*** - significant at 1 percent 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C -13794.2 
(-2.279)** 
-13081.3 
(-2.663)*** 
-16431.7 
(-3.293)"* 
i 1282.195 
(3.310)*" 
1277.38 
(3.327)*** 
1345.548 
(3.564)*** 
Y -0.003 
(-0.214) 
-0.003 
(-0.182) 
-0.001 
(-0.096) 
L 0.270 
(10.033)*" 
0.270 
(10.104)*" 
0.271 
(10.099)*** 
M 306.127 
(2.328)" 
310.594 
(2.412)" 
298.698 
(2.284)** 
D 863.343 
(0.204) 
- 2363.126 
(0.632) 
S 0.003 
(0.480) 
0.003 
(0.446) 
0.005 
(0.714) 
DUM1 -1275.36 
(-0.775) 
-1429.75 
(-0.984) -
DF 73 73 73 
2 
R 0.691 0.695 0.693 
F-Stat 24.322*** 28.781*** 28.446"* 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
" - significant at 5 percent 
" * - significant at 1 percent 
Table 71 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES (LOGARITHM) 
DEMAND FOR SHARE CAPITAL 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C -0.922 
(0.0437) 
-1.125 
(-0.556) 
-2.432 
(-1.262) 
i 1.150 
(1.866)* 
1.163 
(1.905)* 
1.325 
(2.156)" 
H -0.038 
(-0.333) 
-0.048 
(-0.435) 
-0.054 
(-0.477) 
L 0.662 
(7.763)*" 
0.666 
(7.934)*" 
0.685 
(8.046)"* 
M 0.521 
(2.059)** 
0.517 
(2.059)** 
0.544 
(2.126)** 
D -0.004 
(-0.359) 
. - 0.364 
(0.456) 
S -0.003 
(-0.048) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.034 
(0.430) 
DUM1 -0.361 
(-1.651)* 
-0.324 
(-1.688)* 
-
DF 73 73 73 
2 
R 0.660 0.665 0.652 
F-Stat , 21.286*** 25.139*** 23.767*** 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics: 
* - significant at 10 percent 
** - significant at 5 percent 
" * - significant at 1 percent 
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runs when household saving was included in the model (Tables 74 and75). Likewise, the total household 
income variable obtained a negative sign but was not statistically significant (Tables 72 and 73). Similar 
results were also obtained in the OSU-PIDS study, where the income variable had a negative sign but 
was not significant, while the interest rate variable had the correct sign and was significant. However, 
in the regression results of the preliminary study on credit cooperatives conducted by Lamberte (1988), 
the income variable yielded a statistically significant correct sign, though the interest rate variable was 
not included in the model. This seems to suggest that there is a high correlation between income and 
interest rate variables. 
The loan amount variable also yielded the expected positive sign which is highly significant in 
all three sets of regression runs. This supports the hypothesis that members tend to increase their fixed 
deposits in order to obtain larger loans from the credit cooperative. This is not unusual considering that 
the amount of loan a member can borrow is equivalent to a certain multiple of his fixed deposit. Its 
implication is that, putting a cap on the maximum amount of loan per single borrower would, in the long 
run, render the savings mobilization efforts of credit cooperatives ineffective as the demand for fixed 
deposits increases with the size of loans the members can borrow. 
Another variable which has the expected sign and is statistically significant is the number of 
years of membership in the cooperative. This implies that the amount of the fixed deposits held by 
members increases with the length of membership period, or similarly, with the degree of confidence 
in the credit cooperative. 
The dependency ratio has the expected negative sign in most of the regression runs, but it appears 
to be an insignificant variable in explaining the demand for fixed deposits. 
The regression results using the linear form show that the two dummy variables do not have 
statistically significant coefficients. This means that, in the case of dummy variable 1, the demand for 
fixed deposit does not vary among members with stable sources of income and other occupational status. 
This suggests that, all things being equal, income volatility has no particular impact on demand for fixed 
deposits. In the case of dummy variable 2, savings in bank do not affect the demand for fixed deposits. 
This suggests that members treat fixed deposits and bank deposits as different financial instruments 
which yield different benefits to them. Similarly, the total household saving variable did not yield 
statistically significant coefficients in the third set of regression runs, although the expected positive sign 
was obtained (Tables 74 and 75). 
On the whole, the model supports some of the hypotheses explaining the demand for fixed 
deposits. Specifically, the interest rate on variables, amount of loan, and the length of membership 
period significantly explain the members' demand for fixed deposits. However, the model may have 
some limitations which pose difficulties in verifying the effects of other variables that could help explain 
the demand for fixed deposits. These limitations arise from incomplete information for some variables, 
resulting in reduced number of observations included in the estimation. 
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B. Deposit Instruments Offered 
Ninety-three percent of the respondents were aware of the deposit instruments offered by their 
credit cooperatives. These instruments influenced their decision to join the cooperatives. On the other 
hand, those who were not aware were informed by their cooperatives, during the membership training 
seminar, of the types of deposits available to them. 
Credit cooperatives which offer only fixed deposits encouraged all their members to avail of the 
instrument. In other credit cooperatives, however, it appears that not all the members have been 
explicitly encouraged to avail of the different deposit instruments. This is true among 20 percent of the 
respondents. Among the reasons given, as perceived by the respondents, were: (1) savings and/or time 
deposits can be withdrawn any time; (2) there is no communication among officers, staff, and members; 
(3) availing of savings and/or time deposits prevents members from increasing their contribution to fixed 
deposits beyond the required minimum level; and (4) the credit cooperative does not want to increase 
its interest expenses on other types of deposits. Some credit cooperatives, in fact, openly admit that they 
want to maintain simple operations, thus offering only fixed deposits. 
The majority of the respondents have been informed of the interest rates paid on each type of 
deposit, which also influenced their decision to open deposit accounts (i.e., savings and time) aside from 
the required fixed deposit. Interestingly, more than 60 percent of the respondents wanted their credit 
cooperatives to offer, or continue to offer, savings and time deposit services to members. This way, the 
respondents believed that: (1) the cooperative could give members more choices in investing their 
surplus funds in different types of deposits; (2) the cooperative could encourage members to transfer 
their bank savings and/or time deposit accounts into the credit cooperative; (3) the cooperative could 
encourage members to increase their saving contribution through savings and time deposits; and (4) the 
cooperative would be able to attract more people to save. 
C. Interlending Scheme 
This section discusses the extent of the membership's familiarity with the handling of surplus 
funds of the cooperative. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents do not have any idea of how their 
credit cooperatives handle surplus funds. These are the members who were not informed of where such 
surplus funds are deposited. Yet, the respondents believe that they should be informed about it. 
On the other hand, among the respondents who are informed, the majority point out that credit 
cooperatives place surplus funds in depository banks. Only a few are familiar with the interlending 
scheme concept. There are two reasons for this. First, a number of credit cooperatives have not yet 
participated in this interlending scheme. Second, some credit cooperatives have not yet formally 
informed their members about their investment in the central liquidity fund as they are still experiment-
ing with it. Besides, these cooperatives still have very minimal exposure in the central liquidity fund, 
or in the CFF. 
The interviewers took time to explain to the respondents the basic concept of the interlending 
scheme. It appears that the majority favor the placing of surplus funds in the CFF. Among their reasons 
are: (1) interest earnings from the CFF could increase the dividends of members; (2) the credit 
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cooperative could borrow from the CFF in times of liquidity shortfall; (3) the knowledge that the CFF 
could help credit cooperatives with financial problems increases the confidence of members; and (4) the 
cooperative could strengthen its relationship with other credit cooperatives. 
This implies that in order for the program to be fully appreciated and accepted by the general 
membership, credit cooperatives need to launch a massive information drive highlighting the pros and 
cons of the interlending scheme. With better information, the general membership can help in the 
implementation of the program. 
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has examined different aspects of credit cooperative operations. The findings provide 
some insights into the extent of their success in performing the financial intermediation function, and 
the limitations and problems encountered in carrying out this function. The study has also identified 
some areas of strengths and weaknesses of the credit cooperatives in the conduct of their regular 
operations. 
The ability of the credit cooperatives to effectively provide the link between savings and credit 
and, at the same time, maintain their financial viability is a remarkable achievement for this segment 
of the informal credit market. Reciprocity, i.e., savers are given access to credit, is an important feature 
of the credit cooperatives. All this has encouraged the creation of more credit cooperatives all over the 
country. Now, they are not only visible in communities and marketplaces but in private and government 
offices and institutions as well. 
Many credit cooperatives have achieved a remarkable growth in size. Some of them even 
surpassed the asset sizes of rural banks and thrift banks operating in the same locality. This was made 
possible by their ability to sustain a more stable growth pattern over time, which in turn is due to their 
resilience to both internal and external crisis. Many of them have successfully recovered after the 
1983-1984 balance of payments crisis, while the rest of the formal financial system has remained 
under stress. Even more challenging for these credit cooperatives is the fact that their speedy recovery 
and impressive financial performance have not been induced by external factors such as government-
sponsored rehabilitation schemes, as what was done in the case of rural banks and several commercial 
and thrift banks that failed in the wake of the 1983-1984 crisis. Even without government help, the credit 
cooperatives instituted the necessary solutions and adjustments to financial problems, which enabled 
them to reach their present status. This could not have been achieved, of course, without good 
leadership, determined staff, and cooperation of the membership of the credit cooperatives. 
Admittedly, some of the sample credit cooperatives had to overcome internal conflicts and 
management problems arising from differences in personalities and views of the people directly 
involved in handling operations. To some extent, this even triggered a division within the cooperative, 
resulting in the loss of confidence of the general membership. But people with a strong sense of 
commitment and leadership eventually prevailed. They have been instrumental in reviving their own 
credit cooperative and restoring the confidence of members. These efforts, however, are futile 
without total cooperation and unity among the cooperative officers and members. 
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In terms of financial status, the sample credit cooperatives have achieved an impressive real 
growth rate of 26 percent in total resources during the 1984-1988 period. But this expansion is mainly 
accounted for by the increase in fixed deposits, which grew by an average of 26 percent annually in real 
terms during the period. Interestingly, most of them do not impose a ceiling on fixed deposits, or a 
maximum share capital subscription per member. Thus, members are free to increase their share capital 
subscription. Since fixed deposits are the most stable source of funds in the sense that they are not 
withdrawable anytime except on grounds of membership termination, they can be used to sustain long 
term growth of the credit cooperative. 
In sustaining growth, the credit cooperatives could be made less dependent on fixed deposits by 
offering savings deposit instruments. This is important especially for those few which impose a ceiling 
on fixed deposits per member. There are limitations that the credit cooperatives may face if they depend 
on fixed deposits for their future growth. First, a slowdown in membership growth may pose a problem 
in sustaining the increase in fixed deposits. Second, unless additional incentives are offered, members 
may stop increasing their fixed deposits once they reach the single borrower's limit. The borrowing 
capacity of a member is largely determined by the amount of his/her fixed deposit. Considering that 
most of the credit cooperatives in this study have full time cooperative staff, intensifying savings 
mobilization efforts may not be a very difficult task. The cooperative staff can always extend the 
services needed to process deposits and withdrawals during regular operating hours. Almost all credit 
cooperatives accept savings deposits but it appears that only a few of them actively mobilize savings 
deposits from members. The proportion of savings deposits to total assets remains negligible for most 
of them. Likewise, only 51 percent of the sample members have savings deposits with their credit 
cooperatives. This shows the cooperatives' potential in mobilizing deposits from members through the 
offering of new instruments, such as savings and time deposits. This financial innovation requires new 
skills and new management style. Hence, the staff must be trained properly. 
During the period 1984-1988, the proportion of loans outstanding to total assets of the sample 
credit cooperatives has remained relatively high at an annual average of 78 percent. The great bulk of 
these loans were short-term, maturing in one year or less. Most of these loans were for productive 
purposes (i.e., working capital for small-scale business enterprises) and for providential purposes (i.e., 
household consumption). 
The sample credit cooperatives are flexible in implementing cooperative rules and policies and 
this is highly appreciated by their members. This flexibility is evident in their lending policies, 
specifically on collateral requirements and loan repayments. Unlike banks, they do not require 
members to present collateral for loans. Borrowers are required only to have a single co-maker who 
can guarantee the portion of their loans which is not covered by their fixed deposits. In most credit 
cooperatives, the co-maker is even allowed to use the obligated portion of his deposit for loan guarantee 
purposes. Thus, collateral is not a problem in evaluating the qualification of members to borrow. 
In the case of loan repayment, the credit cooperatives normally provide the most convenient 
repayment schedule acceptable to borrowers. The borrower is made to choose the schedule (i.e., daily, 
weekly, bi-monthly, or monthly) according to his cash flow patterns, and the cooperative just follows 
the corresponding interest rate stated in its written lending policies. For institution-based credit 
cooperatives, loan repayment is made through payroll deduction. This reduces time and financial cost 
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associated with performing the transaction, for both the borrower and the cooperative. For market-
vendor credit cooperatives, a collector is normally sent out to the field to collect loan payments from 
individual vendor-borrowers. In this way, the vendors do not have to leave their stalls/stores to perform 
the transaction. Moreover, the credit cooperatives even extend their office hours without imposing 
additional charges to process emergency loans. But this is done very discretely so that it cannot be 
abused by the general membership. 
Unlike banks, loan rejection does not usually occur in credit cooperatives. The latter are flexible 
in dealing with delinquent borrowers, or delinquent members who are applying for a loan. Borrowers 
who arc delinquent in their installment payments can also avail of loan renewal/refinancing privileges 
in most credit cooperatives. What the cooperatives usually do is to reduce the amount of loan extended 
to a delinquent borrower as a penalty. Thus, outright rejection of loan application may not really take 
place in credit cooperatives. 
The only aspect where the credit cooperatives have imposed stringent measures pertains to the 
screening of loan applicants. Most of them require their loan applicants, including repeat borrowers 
with good track records, to undergo the same process of loan evaluation every time the latter apply for 
a new loan. This policy enables the cooperative management to continuously educate members on 
matters of prompt payment of loans. 
Most of the credit cooperatives charge interest rates that are lower than those charged by the 
banks and by other informal sources (i.e., moneylenders) in their areas of operation. This makes them 
a very competitive source of credit. Moreover, they do not discriminate borrowers according to loan 
types, a practice common among formal sources of credit. All of the members have equal access to 
borrowing privileges provided they meet the basic lending requirements, such as paying the required 
minimum share capital subscription, attending the membership training seminars, and others. The 
credit cooperatives also apply uniformly to all borrowers the cooperative's loan ceilings, the appropriate 
loan multiple according to loan types, and interest and non-interest charges on loans. In exceptional 
cases, however, the management may use the loan multiple as an incentive to improve the members' 
attitude toward the credit cooperative. For example, members with good standing may be offered a 
higher loan multiple than the regular one as an incentive to maintain such good standing. The definition 
of good standing, however, varies across credit cooperatives. 
It has been observed that credit cooperatives base their interest rates on savings deposits on 
the rates of the banking system. Some of them even offered rates higher than those paid by the banks. 
The difference ranged from by 0.5 to 2.5 percentage points, depending on their net savings/net income 
performance. This makes them more competitive in terms of resource mobilization in their areas of 
operation. They review their interest rates on savings deposits regularly so that they can respond to 
changes in bank interest rates accordingly. 
Some of the sample credit cooperatives have encountered temporary liquidity shortages, which 
were easily remedied since they were not really caused by low levels of deposits getting into the 
cooperative. The causes were more technical in nature, such as inaccurate projections in matching cash 
inflows and outflows, delays in loan repayments of some members, delays in the payment of employee-
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members' contributions, etc. In dealing with the liquidity shortage, the credit cooperatives tended to 
use policy instruments that were easy to implement, without necessarily going through the process of 
amending the by-laws or the written lending policies. The decision to tap alternative solutions, the most 
common of which was to pursue more vigorously loan recovery, usually depended on the manager. It 
is interesting to note that these credit cooperatives never resorted to borrrowing from banks or from 
other external sources to deal with their temporary liquidity problem. 
On the other hand, most of those which encountered excess liquidity deposited their 
surplus in nearby banks, usually in their depository banks. This shows that the relationship of the credit 
cooperatives with banks is straightforward. Banks serve as a depository of cooperative funds, a linkage 
which may be considered one-sided as these cooperatives do not have access to credit from their banks. 
Some of them have substantial savings and time deposits with banks, amounting on the average, to P/ 
755,239 and P/2,852,240, respectively, as of the survey period. These are potential resources which 
could be used for an interlending scheme. In one credit cooperative, excess liquidity was aggravated 
by the inflow of external funds for relending programs. Thus, extra caution must be made in tapping 
credit cooperatives as conduits of funds for target borrowers. 
Generally, the credit cooperatives would prefer to keep their surplus funds with the most 
accessible banks for purposes of checking account services. Thus, some of them have concentrated their 
deposits in one or two banks which also operate in the same locality. 
Other ways to deal with excess liquidity include increasing the loan multiple and relaxing the 
policy on loan ceilings. This way, the credit cooperative can increase the borrowing capacity of 
members and, at the same time, control the accumulation of surplus funds to avoid incurring high 
opportunity cost on idle funds. Greater flexibility in certain cooperative lending policies does not 
necessarily mean running a higher risk of default. Considering that many of these credit cooperatives 
have a problem of delayed payments instead of loan defaults, the effective monitoring and management 
of loan accounts can help minimize loan delinquency among members. 
The sample credit cooperatives differ in their methods of defining a delinquent loan account. 
They vary in the degree of flexibility that theyexercise in dealing with a delinquent account. Some have 
very rigid criteria while others have a more relaxed policy. For example, some credit cooperatives 
immediately consider a borrower delinquent if he/she fails to pay any of the scheduled installment 
payments of the loan, while others consider a loan delinquent only when the borrower fails to pay the 
entire amount (principal and interest) of the loan during its maturity period. Some cooperatives do not 
document outstanding loans according to the length of time past due simply because the staff might be 
overloaded. It may be true that aging of loans is time-intensive, butthis is one way to effectively monitor 
loan delinquency. Interestingly, most of the sample credit cooperatives do not usually write-off loans; 
they exhaust all means to help the borrower settle his obligations. 
The survey on cooperative membership reveals that the sample households have a great potential 
to save. Almost 71 percent of them have accumulated financial savings during the past 12 months prior 
to the survey. Moreover, 40 percent have realized an increase in their household income during their 
membership with the cooperative. 
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From the sample respondents, cooperative membership has a strong female bias. The member-
ship survey results also show that a significant number of the most recent loans obtained from the 
cooperative were for business purposes. All these suggest that the credit cooperatives are ideal vehicles 
to service women entrepreneurs and small-scale business enterprises. 
The membership survey results also reveal some pieces of evidence that members resort to 
alternative sources of credit (i.e., moneylenders, traders, and relatives/friends) and outlets for their 
surplus resources (i.e., banks and paluwagan). On the saving aspect, this may not be unusual since 
members may be looking for additional financial services not normally offered by their credit 
cooperatives, like telegraphic transfer, checking account, etc. Thus, to avail of these services, the 
members may seek to diversify their savings portfolio by placing some of their savings in banks. But 
on the borrowing aspect, resorting to alternative sources of credit sounds disturbing considering that, 
among the potential credit sources it is the credit cooperative which provides the most flexible terms 
and conditions on collateral requirements and loan repayments. Such cases normally arise when the 
borrowers have already reached their maximum borrowing capacity and, they need other sources to 
augment their loans. To some extent, the members also resort to other sources to circumvent the 
penalties imposed by the cooperative, such as loan reduction. Access to outside sources of credit may 
have an implication on the savings mobilization efforts of the credit cooperatives in the long-run since 
borrowing is highly associated with saving in the cooperative. 
Many of the credit cooperatives have been more flexible in terms of collecting loan repayments, 
and yet very stringent when it comes to screening loan applications. Such practices do not necessarily 
prevent loan delinquency among members. Recognizing the limitations in their savings mobilization 
function, the credit cooperatives can improve their operations and relationship with members by 
offering more efficient services. These include processing of deposits and withdrawals, and faster 
processing and disbursement of loans. 
In the case of moneylenders, loans are generally released on the same day the request is made. 
Thus, credit cooperatives should aim for this standard. More importantly, there is a need for them to 
adopt a more flexible loan ceiling policy. It is important to note that there are affluent cooperative 
members who are capable of obtaining credit in banks, and such lending policies may have adverse 
effects on their patronage of the cooperative. 
Empirical results show that the amount of loan the members can obtain is a very significant 
factor in determining their fixed deposits in the credit cooperative. Thus, placing a cap on the maximum 
amount of loan per single borrower could render savings mobilization efforts ineffective in the long-
run. The empirical results also show that the interest rate paid on fixed deposits is a significant factor 
affecting member behavior in saving with the credit cooperative. 
As the credit cooperative expands, the members' demand for other services also increases. In 
fact, in addition to deposit and lending services, some of these credit cooperatives are contemplating 
to venture into other projects, such as housing/real estate financing, automotive and appliance financing, 
opening a consumers' cooperative, and others. In one integrated cooperative, opening a credit line for 
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members was already implemented to further strengthen .the linkage between its credit division and 
consumer division. This is similar to the universal banking concept now being applied in the banking 
system. Such additional services are to be expected from a continuously expanding credit cooperative. 
However, offering additional services to members should not jeopardize its credit operations by 
reducing its loanable funds to sustain other non-credit services. But certainly, such services may not 
be offered by small and newly-created credit cooperatives. 
Almost all the sample credit cooperatives aie affiliated with the Philippine Federation of Credit 
Cooperatives, Inc. (PFCCI), but only seven of them are shareholders in the Central Finance Facility 
(CFF)as of the survey period. It appears that the interlending scheme is generally a less familiar concept 
especially among credit cooperatives which do not have a direct contact with the PFCCI central office. 
Recognizing that the scheme was introduced to PFCCI-affiliated credit cooperatives just recently, there 
is still a vacuum in the understanding of the program. Better knowledge of the program's mechanism 
and of its potential benefits can help the individual credit cooperatives manage effectively their surplus 
financial resources and their temporary liquidity problem. It can also help them weigh the costs and 
benefits of alternative outlets for their excess liquidity. Promoting the concept of interlending scheme 
requires an intensive campaign by the PFCCI among its member primary credit cooperatives, which 
in turn will relay this new technology to their membership. The campaign should highlight the 
advantages and disadvantages of the interleriding scheme and the overall feasibility of the program after 
taking into account the potential costs and benefits of joining it. The success of the program will largely 
depend on the extent of participation and investment of many credit cooperatives affiliated with the 
PFCCI. Specifically, the campaign must focus on the following broad areas: 
(1) How the interlendi ng scheme can be effectively utilized by credit cooperatives given the 
heterogeneity of their cash flow patterns. The PFCCI must be able to take into account the 
differences in the cash flow patterns of the credit cooperatives. Some cooperatives encounter 
temporary liquidity problems (i.e., liquidity shortage during planting season, opening of classes, 
and holidays, and excess liquidity in other periods of the year) and structural liquidity problems 
(i.e., there is either excess liquidity or shortage throughout the year). 
(2) How the CFF will handle the transfer of funds at least cost for the credit cooperatives, 
especially those located in far away places. This will have a direct bearing on the effective 
dividends or interest earnings of the cooperative's investments with the CFF. It is important to 
note that the credit cooperatives are more likely to keep their surplus financial resources in 
nearby banks if the cost of accessing them is minimal relative to other alternatives outlets. Thus, 
cooperative investments in the CFF must be made more profitable than any of the alternative 
outlets for surplus resources so as not to penalize the returns on share capital of credit 
cooperative members. Likewise, the mechanism for the transfer of funds must be taken into 
account. It appears at present that the transfer of funds will be done through the banking system 
considering that the PFCCI-affiliated cooperatives are highly dispersed throughout the country. 
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(3) How the interlending scheme can provide for additional services to credit cooperatives, 
aside from the borrowing privileges associated for being a shareholder in the CFF. The banks 
where credit cooperatives keep their surplus resources normally provide checking account 
services. Unless the interlending scheme provides similar services, the credit cooperatives are 
likely to maintain their deposit accounts with banks just to continue availing of the services. 
Moreover, it is likely that, for purposes of short-term liquidity management, the credit 
cooperatives would prefer to deposit their surplus resources in nearby banks. 
On another aspect, PFCCI is expected to play a significant role in helping its member 
cooperatives meet the increasing challenge of transforming into bigger financial institutions. Thus, it 
may conduct more intensive and diversified training programs that include general and specific training 
designed to equip its member cooperatives with adequate information on the different aspects credit 
cooperative operations. Specifically, this training must emphasize on the following areas: 
(1) How credit cooperatives can deal with more frequent transactions associated with 
deposits and withdrawals by members. In the OSU-PIDS study, some cooperatives discontinued 
their offering savings deposit services to members because of the high costs incurred in servicing 
more frequent withdrawal transactions. These credit cooperatives were not able to grow as fast 
as they should because they were unprepared to handle financial innovations. 
(2) Effective monitoring credit cooperative performance through a more appropriate 
(updated) management accounting system, delineation of duties and responsibilities of 
personnel to avoid overlapping functions and personnel conflicts, and a more precise process 
of reporting quantitative indicators (i.e., loan delinquency, aging of loans, balance sheet, income 
statement, net income distribution, etc.). The PFCCI may devise a standard format for all 
accounting procedures to facilitate integration of financial reports of its member credit 
cooperatives. 
Lastly, there is a need for PFCCI to keep track of the financial status of its member credit 
cooperatives and of policy pronouncements and changes being effected in the primary cooperatives. The 
diverse characteristics of its member cooperatives makes it extremely difficult for PFCCI to closely 
monitor the operations and performance of individual credit cooperatives. Thus, it is also difficult to 
gather information which may be useful in the formulation of its own policies and of measures that can 
improve the linkage between the primary cooperatives and the federation. Being an organization itself, 
the PFCCI can develop its own computer-based information management system that will facilitate 
record-keeping and updating of information about the perfomance of its member credit cooperatives. 
The use of graphs and analysis showing the movements of key financial and non-financial indicators 
(i.e., growth rates in assets, net income, deposits, expenditures, membership, etc.) used in this study 
may serve as starting models for such purpose. If the PFCCI can devise a system of monitoring the 
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financial status of its member cooperatives on a quarterly basis, to determine heterogeneity in the 
latter's cash flow patterns, managing the CFF can become relatively easy. Likewise, the effective 
information dissemination of board resolutions and minutes of general assemblies will help PFCCI keep 
track of the changes in the policies being effected by the primary credit cooperatives. This flow of 
information from the primary cooperatives will also guide the PFCCI in formulating appropriate 
programs for its members. In the long run, a computer-based information management system will be 
an inexpensive way to obtain, organize, and disseminate information to and from the primary credit 
cooperatives. In this regard, training and computer-based information system are areas where external 
assistance to PFCCI may be concentrated. 
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